Yemen: Assassination of Saleh –

5 Dec

End of Saleh’s third life.

I became interested in Yemen due to a professor (of Iranian studies) who traveled and photographed extensively there. However, I found that few Middle East studies or Arab studies texts covered Yemen. Oddly, I was assigned as a faculty sponsor Col. Taysir Ali Abdullah al-Saleh in my third year at the SSI, at the Army War College. In the aftermath of Saleh’s assassination yesterday, various family members have been killed; have long wondered how Taysir fared.

Ali Abdullah Saleh obituary The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/ali-abdullah-saleh-obituary?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

President of Yemen for 34 years whose refusal to leave the political stage plunged his country into further turmoil

Brian Whitaker

Monday 4 December 2017 12.57 EST Last modified on Monday 4 December 2017 17.00 EST

Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been killed aged 75, held power in Yemen for almost 34 years – an extraordinary feat in one of the world’s most fractious countries. He likened his survival technique to “dancing on the heads of snakes” and his political career ended much as it had begun, in turmoil.

Between 1974 and 1978, the Yemen Arab Republic had three presidents in quick succession. Two were assassinated and the third fled after less than a month in office. A four-man presidential council then took over, in which Saleh soon emerged as leader. In July 1978, the People’s Assembly elected him president of the republic and commander of the armed forces, but there were few who expected him to last very long.

Coming from a lesser branch of the Hashid tribal grouping, he was born in the village of Beit al-Ahmar, near the capital Sana’a. With minimal education, he had risen through the military but had little in the way of a political base – a problem that he set about correcting during his first few years in office. What he lacked in education he made up for with his shrewd handling of people, gradually building a consensus which, besides the military, embraced businessmen and technocrats along with tribal and religious leaders. He had no particular ideology beyond republicanism and nationalism.

The high point of his presidency came in 1990 when, after years of on-off negotiations, Saleh’s Yemen Arab Republic united with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen – the southern part of the country that had been ruled by Marxists since the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967. This initially resulted in a power-sharing agreement for the unified state – a coalition in which the ruling party from each side shared power and a presidential council chaired by Saleh with Ali Salem al-Beidh, the southern leader, as his deputy.

At the same time, Yemen opened up its political system; new newspapers and magazines proliferated and more than 20 parties competed in the 1993 parliamentary elections – the first to be held in the Arabian peninsula under universal suffrage. Promising as this seemed at the time, it was something of a mirage. The former regimes of north and south had unresolved differences which were allowed to persist under the guise of democratic differences rather than using democracy as a means to resolve them. Most important of these differences was the failure to properly merge the armies of the former northern and southern states, which led to them coming to blows during a brief war in 1994 that was won by Saleh’s forces.

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With his southern rivals out of the way and the whole army under his command, Saleh had an opportunity to consolidate Yemen’s national unity but instead he allowed grievances in the south to simmer, leading to a revival of separatist activism. From 2004, at the opposite end of the country, Saleh also fought an intermittent war against Zaidi rebels known as the Houthis, as well as militants linked to al-Qaida in various parts of the country. Saleh’s relationship with the jihadists was always somewhat ambivalent. They had helped him defeat the southern forces in 1994, and though he always claimed al-Qaida was an enemy, he had an interest in not eradicating it. Without the threat from al-Qaida, western countries would have been far less interested in giving him aid.

For years, Saleh was reputedly a regular chewer of qat – Yemen’s national drug – and, since it causes wakefulness, would often follow it up with tipples of whisky in order to sleep. It was at the whisky stage that Saleh got most of his worst ideas, according to one former prime minister who used to unplug his phone at 10pm to avoid presidential calls.

Saleh was also happy to play the democratic game so long as he kept on winning. In 1999 he submitted his own presidency to the electorate for the first time – and won easily, though it undoubtedly helped to have an opponent from his own party (whose campaign expenses Saleh had promised to pay). In 2005, he announced that he was stepping down. “Let’s transfer power peacefully,” he said. “People are fed up with us, and we are fed up with power.” Naturally, his party pleaded with him to stay and Saleh, feigning reluctance, remained in his palace.

Had he left office at that point, he would have done so with a fair record of achievements. He had unified the two halves of the country, had overseen the introduction of a multiparty system and had finally settled Yemen’s borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman, as well as the maritime border with Eritrea.

Like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh was widely thought to be grooming his son, Ahmad, to succeed him in the presidency. Legally, he was due to retire in 2013, though he had been making moves to change the constitution and continue for longer. His rule had also become increasingly repressive, with the local media in particular under almost constant attack. Then came the Arab spring.

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At the start of 2011, popular uprisings broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, giving Yemenis ideas about political change, too. It soon became clear that the northern rebels and southern separatists were not the only malcontents; in fact almost the entire country had turned against Saleh’s rule.

While claiming that he was willing to leave office if allowed do so “with dignity” his behaviour suggested otherwise. Despite being abandoned by many within his own ranks, he clung on regardless while his power evaporated all around him.

There was a narrow escape in June 2011 when a bomb exploded in the private mosque of his presidential palace. Several of the worshippers were killed and Saleh, seriously injured, was flown to Saudi Arabia for treatment.

Protest demonstrations in Yemen continued and it was not until February 2012 that Saleh was finally cajoled into leaving office. Under a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, he was replaced by his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, but the deal also allowed Saleh to stay in Yemen and granted him immunity from prosecution.

This proved disastrous because it allowed Saleh to make mischief from the sidelines. He still had a considerable support network and used it relentlessly to undermine his successor.

In pursuit of that goal he also formed a surprising alliance with his former enemies, the Houthi rebels. It was only because of Saleh’s support that the Houthis were able to seize control of the capital, Sana’a, in 2014, causing Hadi to flee. This later resulted in a Saudi-led military intervention aimed at restoring Hadi’s government – and a continuing humanitarian catastrophe.

Last week, in what seems to have been a planned move, Saleh turned on his Houthi allies and attempted to wrest control of the capital from them. He had clearly lost none of his political ambition but, for once, his snake-dancing skills failed him and Yemen’s wiliest politician came to a brutal and humiliating end.

He is survived by several children, including Ahmad, a former military commander.

• Ali Abdullah Saleh, politician, born 21 March 1942; died 4 December 2017

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Introduction to Conflicting Interests in Egypt: Political, Business, Religious, Gender, Popular Culture. By Sherifa Zuhur and Marlyn Tadros.

10 Jul

Here is the Part I of the Introduction to Conflicting Interests in Egypt. It’s not in the actual book (don’t know a polite way to comment on this, so I won’t) … but it should be!

Conflicting Interests in Egypt: Political, Business, Religious, Gender, Popular Culture. By Sherifa Zuhur and Marlyn Tadros.

Lewiston, N.Y. and Lampeter, Ceredigion, Wales, 2017.

http://mellenpress.com/book/Conflicting-Interests-in-Egypt-Political-Business-Religious-Gender-Popular-Culture/9375/

This book explores aspects of politics, protest, security and culture in post-revolutionary Egypt. These resulted in conflict among various interest groups in Egyptian society an the breaking down of the social foundation of politics. Two long-time observers and scholars of Egypt’s politics and culture collaborate in this book.

INTRODUCTION
Sherifa Zuhur and Marlyn Tadros

Egypt was one of the earliest centralized political entities of the ancient world. To all who study politics, it is held up as an example of a society, which unified around the need to manage its resources. Small communities coalesced under two distinct Kingdoms of Lower Egypt in the Delta and the red desert land of Upper Egypt. When these two united and were symbolized in the Pharaoh’s double crown, the nation reached an important point in its survival and development.
Spiritual and temporal life were subordinated to a system of authority whose monuments still inspire awe and wonder. Thereafter, an incredible mosaic of Pharaonic, Islamic, Mediterranean, African and western cultures continue to be expressed in Egypt and felt and seen in every lifestyle from the poorest to the most exclusive. For reasons explored in this book, the revolution of January 25th 2011 seems to have eroded the ability of different interest groups in this society to ally, if not unify with each other.
In Amam al-‘arsh, (Before the Throne) Nobel prize winning novelist Naguib Mahfouz tries the leaders of Egypt before the court of Osiris, the sun god. One by one from the Pharaohs to Anwar al-Sadat, their contributions and their shortcomings or damages to Egypt are presented and judged.1. Part of the extraordinary breakthrough of the revolution of January 25, 2011 was due to a desire for justice and to lessen the power of a single autocratic ruler to govern his country and oppress his populace. A body of scholarship shows that feudalism, authoritarianism, political violence create their own culture, so one way of explaining the current dilemma is to blame the patterns and pre-existing structures of the ‘deep state.’ Another avenue is to explore the conflicts among and disappointments of the general public.
Rather than directly judging Egypt’s current government on its policies and strategies, we aim in this book to expose the fissures that divide Egyptians today – that emanate from them, as well as from the failures of leadership. Indeed it seems at this moment in history, that peoples’ consciousness and interests are irrevocably dividing them – immigrants and host nations, nationalists and globalists, the religious and the secular, poor and wealthy, formerly colonized and former colonizers. Despite these divisions, there remains a creative current of satire and madcap humor, which Egyptians wield to more clearly define the failure, or the as-yet unrealized promises of Egypt’s revolution. The woes of the security state, the manipulation of the media, the plague of violence against women, and the fundamental distrust of various factions for each other are apparent.
We explore the rise of Occidentalism, or Egypt’s obsession with the west and its influence, which corresponds to the west’s utilization of Orientalism. In so doing, we uncover various conspiracy theories which Egyptians believe about the revolution of January 25, 2011, the coup of July 3, 2013 and each other. We delve into the problematic use of conspiracist thinking in explanations of Egypt’s political shifts, and how these relate to Occidentalism, and the long-standing tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic minority. Some of the conflicts we uncover are masked by Egyptian’s resort to songs and tropes of national unity, which are actually very fragile or even illusory – “we are one hand.” An example is the friction between the Islamists and the Coptic Christians in Egypt that worsened over the years due to the failure of the state to protect its minority citizens.
Dr. Marlyn Tadros, human rights defender and one of the earliest promoters of social media in Egypt, describes the use of Egyptian humor on social media as the revolution evolved and she explores broadcast media’s impact on political dissent. . Humor and satire in the Egyptian context have been used as a form of dissent, and as a weapon against oppression. If the ‘street’ is ill equipped to accept democracy, perhaps humor will bridge that gap because humor challenges people’s previously held notions. Satire therefore reflects the evolving psychology of the masses as well as indirectly affecting and enhancing people’s cognitive consciousness. As such, it may challenge authority as in the case of the Egyptian revolution where it has revealed a pattern of eroding distrust towards the authorities.

Together, the authors, who are both longtime advocates of women’s rights as well as democracy, expose the horrendous new use of violence in public against women during and following the January 25, 2011 revolution. Tadros sees the use of rape and harassment as a shocking denouement for a society in which women have struggled so hard to move into the public sphere and attained professional respect despite many constraints in social attitudes and unfair legislation. Whether under the armed forces’ [SCAF’s] brief but decidedly momentous rule following the ouster of President Mubarak, under the religious regime of the Muslim Brotherhood, or under the subsequent current military regime, violence against women persisted with varied manifestations. Zuhur explores how Syrian refugee women who arrived in Egypt were also subjected to similar violence. The authors explored the justifications given for public violence against women and the perceived political gain from women’s victimization, as well as questioning the cultural and social implications of this violence.
Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, who has written widely about Islamist movements in and outside of Egypt, provides the background and analyzes the state’s response to the insurgency in the northern Sinai peninsula, which worsened in August of 2013. She provides a cameo of an ultra-supporter of the Sisi movement, Sama al-Masri and the sarcastic popular tropes, including anti-Americanism, that al-Masri utilized on private video channels. Al-Masri interestingly draws on Egypt’s dance and music traditions.
Zuhur writes about the role of Egypt’s big businessmen, and the question of whether or not a counterrevolution has occurred. Zuhur relates the outcome of trials of ex-President Mubarak and his allies, associates, and relatives. She also questions the role of the military in response to those who ask “who really rules Egypt today?” Tadros shows the manipulation of the public by prominent media personalities who thus further the goals of the security state-within-the-state.
The volume provides coverage of a tumultuous and contested time in Egypt’s history, a crucial period when its revolutionary dreams could be manifested, lost, or salvaged only in part, as the country attempts to stay afloat economically. The quest for less authoritarianism, more justice and freedom appear as complicated as ever.

1. Naguib Mahfouz, Amam al-‘Arsh (Cairo: Maktabat Misr, 1983).

How to Conduct Research Interviews – Sherifa Zuhur

5 Apr

Embarking on Research Interviews

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur

 

(I want to encourage scholars and students, in the face of severe cuts to academic, scientific and humanities funding, to continue doing interviews, but to learn how in a less teleological manner than I did, when I was a student in Egypt. I’m also a big supporter of free journalism and believe that academics must read journalists, but develop and pursue their own hypotheses. )

 

You’re writing a paper, a senior thesis, need interviews for your master’s thesis or dissertation. You aren’t a journalism student, you aren’t even comfortable carrying on conversations at a party or during a class break. While interviewing you must adopt a new persona – to the extent that you can — loosen up and act like an old-fashioned bartender or maître d’ who takes the time to get to know his/her customers, asking questions in a friendly manner – but not as pointed as those of the amateur detective. You are a person meeting someone else for the first time (usually) who wants to obtain relevant facts about them and from them. You should practice such conversational interrogation skills with classmates, colleagues, friends, roommates, significant others prior to interviewing. Imitate or channel your elders who swiftly interview unknown guests at family dinners. If you have no-one in your life to help you with this, then you should at least rehearse your questions once you develop them (see below).

 

Whether you have excellent social skills or not, you’ve demonstrated your intelligence and perseverance in your coursework, and these qualities will assist you in the interview process. Your first step is to prepare yourself to describe yourself and your research very succinctly and clearly in one or two sentences. You must describe yourself so your subjects understand your positionality vis a vis the topic. I am from country X, at university X, in X major, my advisor is X (many people won’t know or care who this is, but a few might).  Some respondents will want to know how you speak the language. Explain. I took X many years of language X, or I learned it as a child.

 

**** Oops! So you think you’re going to do interviews without knowing the language of your respondents? Yes, you can, but it will be difficult. You can bring a translator (but you’ll be relying on their interpretation). If your language skills are sub-par, then explain to your respondent that you want to interview them in English, but be prepared with an accurate version of your questions in the relevant language.****

 

Rejection of an Interview Opportunity If you are a foreigner, you may then receive a curt rejection. “I don’t speak to Americans.” Or as I did “I don’t speak to anyone at an American university.” Somehow you must phrase your request so that it becomes a desirable invitation. You can mention that you’ve spoken to another interviewee, or persons in nearby town X. Or, “Well, I could write the topic without doing interviews, but I want to know what people really think, instead of taking Western reporters’ views as the only perspective.”   You can add, “If you aren’t interested, do you know someone else who will speak with me” (And if they agree, you should also ask them about other possible interviewees if you want multiple interviews and are using the snowballing method).   If they are dead-set against being interviewed, then politely apologize and continue on to the next prospect.

 

Purpose of Your Interviews.

You must explain to your interview subjects what you’re doing and also why you are interviewing them. You cannot set out in a fog of theoretical prefacing; saying that you are contextualizing your subject as many of your interlocutors won’t understand that, nor will your readers. I recognize this is more difficult for some types of interviews than for others and that history students keen to avoid teleological methodology may not do very well here – because interview material SHOULD help you form and state hypotheses. But you cannot fish blindly – so try rephrasing your main research question in the form of a purpose, i.e.

 

(drawing from my own field interviews)

 

  1. a)   I am trying to find out how much of an impact Hizbullah had on residents’ lives in this area.

 

  1. b) I want to know what women think about Islamist ideology on gender.

 

  1. c) what if there is a war with Iran – what will happen to oil facilities?

 

  1. a) was acceptable but a more neutral introductory question was

I want to know how the war has affected the lives of people in this area (the area chosen is where HZB dominates, although not in the entire area) – granted, I did that research in ’99 and the hawadith, the pseudonymic, apologetic term for the war, were still an important trope of political/social orientation.

 

  1. b) is a fail – because I had to construct a model of Islamist ideology on gender FROM my respondents’ visions and reactions.   But everyone I spoke to aimed towards a positive or negative interpretation of Islamism & was concerned that I was representing the opposite of whatever they thought.

 

Here were other ways of getting at that:

 

b revised) I want to know if the Islamiyyun (because Islamists was a disputed term then) are affecting society/women/politics …. I used all 3 of these terms.

 

  1. c) was fine when addressed to CEOs, upper level officials, but made others inappropriately nervous.

 

After you plan how to describe your research – then ask yourself what you hope to uncover, or reveal (the verb I used in my own first book title) through the interview process.  Do not decide on your findings before you obtain them!

 

You may have multiple purposes – you may wish to understand your interlocutors social, economic or political status. That goes into the profile you construct of interviewees prior to research questions to be asked of many – if you are doing multiple interviews. If it’s a single interview, then this information is still quite important.    If you are developing a structured interview, then these questions pertaining to profile will help you in any quantification – of age/background etc. to particular attitudes for ex.

 

This requires some background research on your own part. Look the person up on the Web, review any statements by or about them, and birthdate, place, education, known associations, employment. Familiarize yourself with micro-areas, villages, towns, suburbs. Go visit them if possible and try to find out what they were like at the time your respondent was growing up. You may well say, oh Sherifa, you could take the buses all over Syria at the time you lived there, but I can’t do that. At least make an effort to know the physical, social, and political ‘location’ of your respondent for ex. that Giza was once quite individual villages which now appear to blend together as empty spaces were filled in – and that their inhabitants included important families A, B or C. Don’t leave this background information out, telling yourself that you’re not an anthropologist and you don’t need it. You most certainly must combine the roles of anthropologist, historian, police investigator, general snoop dog on your subject, and learn to discern accurate information from gossip along the way.

 

If you can’t visit these places, make that part of the interview – it’s usually useful to know your subject’s perception of his/her own environment and how and when your subject became conscious of his/her own social location.

 

Here’s a good general reading on interviews –

 

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hamza_Alshenqeeti/publication/269869369_Interviewing_as_a_Data_Collection_Method_A_Critical_Review/links/55d6ea6508aed6a199a4fd34/Interviewing-as-a-Data-Collection-Method-A-Critical-Review.pdf

 

Please note, he presents the option of an open-ended interview as if it is ‘unstructured.’ In oral history, the open-ended interview is a desirable path, but it need not be unstructured. Rather, you add on questions to encourage your respondent to keep speaking when they become engaged in the conversation with you. In oral history, one guideline is to ask “historically relevant” questions. You are seeking a bigger picture, not simply chronically the life or thoughts of an individual.

 

Many of these guidelines are relevant

http://www.oralhistory.org/about/principles-and-practices/

 

However, if you aren’t an oral historian, some of this isn’t relevant. You are responsible for clarifying the situation of ownership over the material of the interview itself. You aren’t required to give your materials to a repository (I didn’t, but wish I had) but you may wish to do that if you see that others could benefit from this material.

 

How Many Interviews? Another interesting possibility is to interview multiple subjects who necessarily view one event or experience differently than others. For example, you might be interviewing people of one faction or group opposed to another, or whose families fought one another, or who were part of the same organization or institute, and yet had decidedly different experiences.   Then, a ‘history’ becomes the meeting point of differing perceptions of an event, and its impact.

 

Your field, finances, time and access may determine how many interviews you carry out. More is not necessarily better. Perhaps your research focuses on a single figure, those who knew that figure, or you plan to publish the interview in full – which will necessarily limit the number of interviews. If you’re studying a philosopher, or a theorist, for example, you might only research that individual. You might submit questions in advance to an interviewee, but then expect more polished and less spontaneous responses.   In this case, it seems the researcher had read an early (1993) interview of Butler, but should perhaps have informed her in advance of her questions.   (See where Butler says she doesn’t remember, doesn’t reread her own work) Yet there is value in her response on performativity.   http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1363460716629607?journalCode=sexa

 

If you are in sociology, economics, or politics, you may need to select a representative sample and the size must relate to the total size and composition of your topic, or population. A recent study of Syria’s millions of refugees used a sample of only 130 people, and acknowledged that it wasn’t representative, but nonetheless issues recommendations on the basis of the information. Any large study will more likely require a questionnaire and you must decide if you are additionally interviewing in order to obtain qualitative as well quantifiable responses.  Snowballing is another method – just acknowledge your use of this method.   Public opinion surveys aren’t the same as research interviews! Treat the material accordingly.

 

Questions  The next step is to formulate questions. In a qualitative interview, you want to use open-ended questions; those which cannot be answered by a mere ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ If respondents answer with a yes or a no, you need to rethink and then reformulate the question.   As my research combined sociology with history, political science and also religion, I frequently failed in this effort. For example, in one questionnaire (which I memorized) I asked “Should Egypt be an Islamic state?” To my dismay, all of my respondents answered that it was an Islamic state and tended not to elaborate on that & we then got off-track discussing Saudi Arabia or Iran. On the one hand, that in itself was informative on their views of Wahhabism, revolutionary Iranian Islamism, and their opinions that Egypt wasn’t similar.

Try to cleanse your questions of pre-formed judgments which ‘lead’ the interviewee. For example, don’t say “You have a reputation for being very controversial,” but instead formulate a question about the source of that controversy … i.e. “you wrote a book on the non-existence of God .. what was the immediate or later response to it?”

 

Obtain permission from your respondents. Use a release form with a signature or obtain their oral permission. Depending on your field, topic or goals, you may be concealing or including their names. I found that promising and holding to anonymity was extremely useful in interviews of individuals who fear oversight by their countries’ security apparatuses. But in other cases, I interviewed officials or leaders who could either speak freely, or not, however it was understood their names would be used.   It is understood that in academic research, the lens and opinion of the researcher determines how material should be presented. Some members of the general public don’t understand this. You may encounter individuals who won’t allow you to publish their views unless you show them the quote, or section on them prior to publication. This is NOT the preferred journalistic or academic standard as it encourages self-censorship, censorship or promotion of that individual’s stand or position to the detriment of your own. Be careful here! If you want to interview a president in office or a CEO by name, expect such an outcome, or be prepared for some sort of negative response post-interview – it may happen, or not.   As an academic, you only have a responsibility to correctly convey your own insights. You are not bound, as I was, in DoD to correctly interpret national security policy (which is itself, often vague and therefore more open than one might think).

 

Now here’s where your rehearsal or practice session comes in – ask some version of these questions to your roommate – or if you can, a classmate. Yes, I know your roommate doesn’t know anything about X – but he does know about some other matter/event/person. Also practice reading your questions aloud and try to eliminate sub-clauses and extremely complex terms. You should not sound as if you’re reading, but speaking with your respondent. You also want to practice recording an interview, either on an I-Phone notes, IPod, or an old fashioned recorder – make sure you know how to start, stop and review.  Yes, you want a recording! E-questions or those submitted in writing lack the same authenticity and tone of recorded or in-person interviews. You can hear emotion (or lack thereof) in your respondent’s voice. He or she may get angry. That’s important too. Back off. Apologize and start over. Or don’t apologize, but just shift gears into a new topic area, make up a different question.  In a written questionnaire, the problem is that your formal phrasing provides a shortcut – a highly educated respondent will be able to respond with some text you can use immediately, but you won’t have learned or sensed what your respondent thinks about the question.

 

When your respondent is especially animated about something, ask a second question, or just say “can you tell me more about that?” When you complete your questions, ask your respondent if s/he would like to add anything, or invite them to speak on something that you might have skipped over before.

 

Diverters.

Here I want to paraphrase and cite Marlyn Tadros from her chapter on humor, Twitter & the revolution from our forthcoming book on Egypt:   After Egypt’s revolution, Hazem Isma’il was his party’s favorite to run for president (but he was bypassed from this opportunity because his mother was a U.S. citizen). He answered every journalistic question with the very American phrasing “I’m so happy you asked me that question, and then blah, blah.” People made fun of this tendency as it seemed that he did this to give himself a second to answer the question which he certainly wasn’t prepared to answer. She quotes a series of tweets on this such as:

 

@M7mdAboSoliman iwaa tisma’a lihad yo[q]illak fi bidayat kalamuh ana sa’id innak sa’altni al-sua’al da. Ummu amrikiya [don’t listen to anyone who begins his sentence with ‘I am happy you asked me this question’. His mother is American.][i]

 

The irony to some Egyptians was this salafi leader’s pretense at authenticity though he had this American styling (and it did not help that it was revealed that he had plastic surgery to alter his nose).

 

You may interview a dissembler or a distractor – the Distractor may stall on a question or actually ignore your question and then begin speechifying on his/her own favorite topic or a point that he/she wishes to make. Let him do this. Then ask the question again.

 

Perils of Outside Interference in Your Questions. To newbies who use fixers. (For journalists, and some traveling researchers, a fixer is a person – sometimes, a local journalist — who is hired to help arrange an interview, or the entire story. This person may drive you, guide you, translate and will suggest interviewees to whom s/he has access) Don’t let your fixer suggest questions in the interview; you need to shape your own interview. Yes, you will have conversations with the fixers in which they are trying to determine what you want to know. I should probably write another blog entry about using fixers as the important differences between journalism and academic research play in here; and also the topic of keeping safe while interviewing.

 

Sometimes another person attends the interview, a relative, a cohort or colleague of the individual you are interviewing and that person may interrupt or attempt to lead the interview in a different direction. Just let them know you’ll be happy to hear their comments as soon as you conclude your questions.

 

Other Problems. You may run into a person who is or is not an academic, but feels ownership over the topic and who may give you trouble, or even threaten you during or following an interview. If you are a student, alert your professor or dissertation supervisor of any such a threat, but know that the respondent has no right to threaten you, particularly if they agreed to meet with you or be interviewed in the first place. Don’t let people with psychological problems or jealousy derail your efforts, or radically change the course of your research.

 

Several of us have experienced this with regard to closed movements – religious movements which try to control information about the group in question. It’s fine to shift gears and use secondary sources, or seek a different respondent if this particular person gives you trouble.

 

Or, maybe you start out in an interview and it disintegrates for some different reason. You may want to apologize to the respondent and just call it a day. If you are a single woman do be professional, and yet aware that male respondents might flirt or act unprofessionally in an interview setting. It may help if someone else is present, but that might not be possible.

 

Post-Interview.   Make written notes prior to transcribing your interview. Where it took place, what time and date, any special circumstances (terrible storm, gunfire made some of my interviews memorable – were other people present). Then write out the profile information you’ve gathered.

 

Next, a useful technique is to make headings on 3 x 5 cards – especially if you have multiple interviews, but also otherwise. What stood out to you? What did you hear that you hadn’t even imagined or thought about prior to the interview? For example, I wrote one heading under ‘PR’ for a theme in a leader’s interview in which he complained about not being able to speak to Americans and I had played along saying – “Ok, if you could, what would you say?” Was he propagandizing to me, or responding to a previous interview? I had to decide how to interpret this information.

 

Analyze what you learned from the interview. This process may take longer than you think.   You may decide you need additional interviews, or to narrow or broaden your approach to the topic. For example if I couldn’t interview people who were contemporaries with a particular figure, I might decide to write about another contemporary or rival of his in the same piece. What have you learned from this primary source – interview responses that you weren’t aware of? Can you limit this to a series of key findings? What if your respondent presented nothing new or unexpected? Did he or she verify any key fact for you?

 

Decide where to directly quote your interviewee and where to paraphrase. If your respondents have said they MUST see the material before you publish (you are highly advised NOT to offer such review) then you must contact them prior.   In such cases, the use of anonymity or partial anonymity is quite useful.

 

Re-read your secondary sources and other primary sources on the topic.   Maybe something from your interviews is reflected or hinted at here and you will notice it. Do this after completing or at least embarking on your analysis so you won’t be so influenced by pre-existing analyses.

 

For the Quantifiers. Re-check the neutrality of your phrasing. Run your numbers and consider what the interesting correlations mean. People under 30 think X but people over 50 think Y? Yes, that’s important. I was warned that people wouldn’t be interested in my data, but I devoted a chapter of my dissertation to it anyway and I’m glad I did as it illustrated a growing trend that many sought to deny.   However, be prepared to summarize your findings for those who don’t want to read the nuances or complications in that data.

 

Visuals. What about documentaries or research questions which are part of a video project? Here, you need to more carefully edit your questions with your audience in mind. Ideally you could tape more than one session and then edit down to your needs. Your product will be more of a cameo of the interviewee than is the case in a standard interview & you have to think about it visually. Yes, you can conduct a ‘talking heads’ interview, but it is much more appealing to present an interviewee in the context of the subject of the interview or in his/her residence, along with something meaningful to them. It depends whether your primary aim is as a videographer or an academic; and you may choose to introduce other materials, photographs etc.   A useful course, or part of a course could be taught by professional filmmakers/videographers along with academics as their intentions differ.

 

If you don’t use video, consider taking a photograph of your interviewee if s/he agrees (and remember if it was an anonymous interview, you can’t use this without permission).

 

Citation   Your interviews are primary sources. As such they should be listed separately in your bibliography or reference list. The source is the respondent, not you – don’t list them under your last name (unless your publisher requires you to do so). If you have promised anonymity, then the form is Personal Interview with Mr. X, give the location and date, or Personal interview by the author/your full name with Mr. X.

 

Never, never, never falsify this information!   Journalists and academics who do so are committing an intellectual crime.

 

If you feel that oral information is important, but this wasn’t a true interview, then use the format: Personal communication by Full Name of Respondent on date and the method (telephone, email, or the location if it was in person).

 

[i] Abu Sulaiman, [M7mdAboSoliman] October 23, 2012, accessed, December 18, 2016,

https://mobile.twitter.com/M7mdAboSoliman/status/260937556374458368

The Islamic State’s Threats to Voters in ’16 US Elections

7 Nov

Sherifa Zuhur

I was asked to give my comments on ‘Caliph’ al-Baghdadi’s recent audiotape and also ISIS’ statement on U.S. elections. I’ll start with the second, much easier task.

ISIS oppose elections in the U.S. and more importantly it opposes democracy in any Islamic society and the idealized Islamic state – the Caliphate.  Their latest document provides the doctrinal reasons for doing so.  While there might be political rationale for changing positions on this question (as did the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas), the Islamic State will pursue, to the bitter end, the religious justifications for arguing against a democratic, populist form of government (one which would unseat authoritarian modes of government, such as their own).

Their argument against voters participation in the U.S. election is firstly:

that both sides – GOP and Democrats – are inimical to the interests of Islam and Muslims.

Here is a translation of the document.  Walking through it provides little novelty to those familiar with the group, but there might be some surprises for those who don’t read texts.

http://heavy.com/news/2016/11/isis-islamic-state-al-hayat-media-the-murtad-vote-pdf-download-read-2016-presidential-election-hillary-clinton-donald-trump-apostasy/2/

IS  directs their argument in these initial arguments to/about Muslims by calling such elections an ‘apostate’ vote.  Thus the Gore-Bush election and that of Obama were also acts of apostasy.  They are especially bitter to former mujahid/neosalafi Safar Hawali who has spoken out against jihadism on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government (you can look him up in works on extremism in Saudi Arabia).  But also towards Muslims who voted for Bush in Florida

Similarly “murtaddin” (renouncers of Islam and thus apostates) are the MuslimBrotherhood and “sister sects” who support participation in the U.S. elections and have done so for other elections, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Palestine.

ISIS say the only difference between Hilary Clinton and Trump is that the former is more skilled in political correctness.

ISIS is fiercely opposed to feminism (it would not acknowledge being anti-woman) and opposes Hilary as a “female feminist” & cites the well-known hadith “Never shall a people who give their leadership to a woman be successful.” (incidentally, this was a reference to the daughter of a Sassanian ruler).

#ISIS states that both Trump & HRC “committed themselves to the Jewish state” – meaning Israel, as indeed, have nearly all U.S. candidates, not only for president, but other positions.

The group condemns the outcome of elections by commenting on President Obama’s actions in the Muslim world – his invasion of Iraq & Sham, interference in Libya, his drone strikes Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia.

The Islamic State regards  HRC  as the more dangerous candidate — she is  able to lead more Muslims astray (into apostasy) by exploiting the notion of a liberal Islam or moderate Muslims.  To this they contrast Trump’s (or his advisors) definition of radical Islam as being distinct from Islam.  They write that he needs to understand that their proposals ARE Islam itself (which is ironically, the attack of right-wing analysts on all Muslims).

The group shows its intentions of not only attacking the legitimacy of elections but the rhetorical and  ‘false divisions’ of Muslims that have been created by Western (and also some Muslim) politicians, media and analysis.

If anything, this document shows that the Islamic state and all its ilk, whether al-Qa’ida offshoots or the #Jihad 3.0 variant of ISIS that may emerge in a few years, will always oppose Western-style democracy & its imposition or growth in Islamic lands.

The next doctrinally-based argument is to decry all that which is not based on Shari’ah; and all who accept  human-made legislation, judges, rulers who impose it – as tawaghit.

ISIS underscores its uncompromising view of tawhid — the single and sole authority of Allah —  in this document and aims to associate the Western or democratic vision of Islamic world with sin and apostasy.

The document goes on to condemn those who are affiliates or associates in apostasy; and who fail to act against it, as apostates.  Thereby it condemns ideal of popular legislation and voter participation as ‘ar-rida bi-kufr, kufr’;  silent consent in apostasy is apostasy.

It condemns those who ‘fight’ for the supporters of apostate democracy (which could mean the Sunni soldiers of the Iraqi Defense Forces) or any supporters of the U.S. and all those allies of Christians & Jews — a much widern net.

“Fear of deportation and abuse” is not an excuse for association with kufr  (apostasy) or Christians or Jews (This could be seen as a reference to Trump’s campaign and the urging of U.S. Muslim organizations to get out and vote against a candidate who threatens their presence in the United States.

ISIS writes that although one could argue this is coercion, the proper response to coercion is hijrah or flight (to an Islamic state) but not association with apostasy or its support.

The document makes many allusions to the early Muslims who betrayed the Muslims; and states that when angels seize sinners’ souls, they will ask didn’t they have the opportunity to emigrate (wasn’t the world sufficiently broad for them to take another alternative) instead of committing apostasy.

ISIS warns that even those with good intentions — for example to defend Muslims — who commit shirk, will be punished.

The document then states that given all of these preceding proofs, it is licit, and indeed obligatory to kill all those participating in the US apostate elections, for they are renegade apostates or Crusaders.

The language here is clearly directed at the popular electoral process:  “Say O Disbelievers, we do not worship the people”.

The Islamic State makes it clear that it is threatening threat  “Crusader” voters as well including women, who aren’t merely married and subjugated to their husband’s vote, they are voting on their own.  This may seem a bit of an obscure reference, but it pertains to the waging of violence on women.

The document concludes by asking Allah to wreak calamity on US election day like none other in American’s “pathetic history.” So does this mean that ISIS has planned violent actions?  It may have, and it would be foolish to assume that any intended by “lone wolves” might not be connected to IS Western-targeted planning departments.

In sum, this document illustrates the Islamic State’s uncompromising insistence that its Caliphate represents true Muslims – as compared to nation states & democratization even in the face of the group’s assured defeat in  Mosul and following that in Raqqa.

President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s Impact on Egypt – Sherifa Zuhur

21 Oct

 

I was asked to communicate President al-Sisi’s impact on Egypt by a journalist, who said he intended to put my responses into an article for the Wall Street Journal (9/8/16).  As far as I know, it wasn’t printed, but there were a few other similar pieces which came out at that time which were highly critical, if not condemnations of Egypt.  I assumed that my responses did not please the editors, but I thought they might interest you!

– President Sisi’s most important and potentially lasting effects on Egypt are:

 

  1. Imbuing in Egyptians the sense that their President (and therefore their other officials and institutions) must be accountable to them; justify policies and meet their needs. The President began a series of public addresses which were essentially follow-ups/report cards on specific issues. This was despite the fact that he cannot (and one would not expect him to be able to) summarize all of the forward and retrograde currents; and the fact that in certain instances those dealing with fraud were then prosecuted by the state.

 

  1. As Defense Minister and then President, he moved – at the public’s and the military leadership’s behest — against the oldest, strongest Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, Freedom and Justice. Here, Egypt’s path diverged from other nations impacted by the Arab Spring. It would be grandstanding to say that Egypt has by these means chosen a secular state, because its legal system is only semi-secular and one must acknowledge the support of certain salafi groups for the current government. This meant there is a check to the Muslim Brotherhood/Freedom & Justice Party’s longstanding animosity to Egypt’s Copts, and ambiguous attitude toward’s women’s rights and other human and intellectual rights. It meant that President Morsi’s language which indicated that his tribe or ‘people’ were Islamists and Brethren and not all Egyptians was unsuccessful. This course of action meant his presiding over a purge which impacted liberals and youth as well as Islamists, and however popular with an internal majority, has been sharply criticized outside of the country.

 

  1. Sisi has presided over the most active counterterrorism campaign(s) in the country’s history for some decades, and the main impetus of that campaign — in the northern Sinai — has been fiercely fought. By and large, the situation in the rest of Egypt has been stabilized.

As a response to this problem and the resistance funded or supported by the Islamists discussed in (b), he has unfortunately curtailed Egyptians political rights by not altering the so-called protest law (107 of ’13 approved under acting Pres. Mansour). Parliament’s upholding of this law, and approval of many laws and edicts introduced in the absence of a legislature is one of the obstacles impeding better relations between Egypt’s highly divided liberals and government supporters. In the long term, a movement towards expressions of political freedom (which do not endanger others or destroy property and cause havoc as was seen on campuses and in the streets) and away from the use of military courts would be highly desirable. It seems that Egypt was unable to establish a direction for its policies free of these political limits despite the revolution, and admission that Egyptian political rights prior to it were insufficient.

 

  1. President Sisi faced a huge challenge in stabilizing and selecting projects and policies to move the country forward economically. His oversight of several grand projects – the ‘second’ or additional Suez Canal, the new administrative capitol city, and the medical city, among them — will at least temporarily employ many Egyptians in their construction. These should help improve Suez trade and decentralization in the future; the more immediate economic stabilizer is the $12 billion IMF loan. Other imperatives to ameliorate the rising cost of living, un- and under- employment and failing public utilities and service have presented challenges. Foreign direct investment may rise, but it is still a difficult road for investors, and President Sisi’s government has reviewed the exchange rate policy and adjusted currency rates (another adjustment may be required); and tried, but not yet addressed ambiguous tax policies. Foreign direct investment still presents many obstacles and restrictions to would-be investors.

 

Leveling austerity measures on Egypt’s large poor and almost-poor population is very unpopular. Such measures were unpopular in the UK, but the public’s safety net is stronger. Outbursts on social media show the strength of popular resentment that the current government has neither brought “bread” – nor dignity, freedom and an end to corruption (the ideals of the January 25th, 2011 revolution).

 

  1. Pres. Sisi impressed me and others as knowing and understanding how far Egypt had to travel to democracy and wrote, as you know in his SRP in 2006, some observations about the potential to and obstacles in the way of democracy in the Arab Islamic world. To this end, I personally was hoping he would make good his promises to improve Egypt’s educational system, which is in very dire straits, and to address the hype and problems with academic and intellectual freedom in Egypt.   The latter is not helped by the conspiratorial tone of the media seeing “foreign hands” here, there and everywhere. But the media reflects a lack of critical thought, which in turn, can only be addressed with standards of tolerance, which must be introduced in and throughout the educational system.

 

If he does so, I hope that new policies will not direct thousands of low-income students to vocational schools as seems to have developed out of the not-fully-realized state socialist policies of the past. I believe Pres. Sisi himself is an egalitarian, but much depends on who may advise and craft reform of that nature.

 

  1. President Sisi has upheld the framework of the Camp David Accords. A further large-scale war would be disastrous for Egypt, but on the other hand it remains to be seen if he can move forward peace between the Palestinians and Israel. He had encouraged meetings between Israel and the Palestinians to be hosted by Russia, and presented a plan to President Abbas recently which offers land in the Sinai to add to the PA territory in Gaza. Abbas has rejected this plan outright, and Sisi has run the risk of being accused of giving away Egyptian land (as in the Tiran/Sanafir islands uproar).   But the offer indicates a proactive dimension to President Sisi’s leadership which might bear more fruit on this issue in the future.

 

On other regional matters, Egypt’s government has engaged with Ethiopia since the building of the Renaissance Dam – which could threaten the Nile’s water supply which is crucial to Egypt and the Sudan– began. It has rather inexplicably and irrationally backed Assad’s government in Syria, but stated that its support is for fighting terrorism. However, since the huge numbers of Syrian casualties and displacement indicate that the rebellion is not, in fact a matter of terrorism, but a strongly supported aim at regime change — one must be aware of Egypt’s fear that a post-Assad government would bring to power Islamists unfriendly to it, or more specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood. President Sisi’s generally good relations with Saudi Arabia have been ruffled by their differences on Syria, and current economic problems in the Kingdom, but Saudi-Egyptian ties are likely to remain close.

Palestinians Rebut Blumenthal & Other Critics of Syria’s Revolution

12 Oct
On The Allies We’re Not Proud Of: A Palestinian Response to Troubling Discourse on Syria
We, the undersigned Palestinians, write to affirm our commitment to the amplification of Syrian voices as they endure slaughter and displacement at the hands of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. We are motivated by our deep belief that oppression, in all of its manifestations, should be the primary concern of anyone committed to our collective liberation. Our vision of liberation includes the emancipation of all oppressed peoples, regardless of whether or not their struggles fit neatly into outdated geopolitical frameworks.We are concerned by some of the discourse that has emerged from progressive circles with regards to the ongoing crisis in Syria. In particular, we are embarrassed by the ways in which some individuals known for their work on Palestine have failed to account for some crucial context in their analysis of Syria.

The Syrian revolution was in fact a natural response to 40 years of authoritarian rule. The Assad regime, with the support of its foreign financial and military backers, is attempting to preserve its power at the expense of the millions of Syrians whom the regime has exiled, imprisoned, and massacred. We believe that minimizing this context in any discussion of Syria dismisses the value of Syrian self-determination and undermines the legitimacy of their uprising.

We also believe that an important consequence of all foreign interventions, including those purportedly done on behalf of the uprising, has been the setback of the original demands of revolution. The revolution is a victim, not a product, of these interventions. It is imperative for any analysis of Syria to recognize this fundamental premise. We cannot erase the agency of Syrians struggling for liberation, no matter how many players are actively working against them.

Though we maintain that the phenomenon of foreign aid demands thorough critique, we are concerned by the ways in which foreign aid has been weaponized to cast suspicion on Syrian humanitarian efforts. Foreign aid is not unique to Syria; it is prevalent in Palestine as well. We reject the notion that just because an organization is receiving foreign aid, it must follow then that that organization is partaking in some shadowy Western-backed conspiracy. Such nonsense has the effect of both undermining humanitarian efforts while simultaneously whitewashing the very crimes against humanity that necessitated the aid in the first place.

Furthermore, we object to the casual adoption of “war on terror” language. Enemies of liberation have historically used this rhetoric to target humanitarians, organizers, and community members. From Muhammad Salah to the Midwest 23 to the Holy Land Five, our community is all too familiar with the very real consequence of employing a “war on terror” framework. Therefore, we reject a discourse that perpetuates these old tactics and peddles harmful and unwarranted suspicion against Syrians.

Along these lines, it is our position that any discussion of Syria that neglects the central role of Bashar Al-Assad and his regime in the destruction of Syria directly contradicts the principles of solidarity by which we abide. We have reflected on our own tendency to heroize those who advocate on behalf of the Palestinian struggle, and we fear that some members of our community may have prioritized the celebrity status of these individuals over the respect and support we owe to those Syrians affected most directly by the war, as well as those living in the diaspora whose voices have been dismissed as they have watched their homeland be destroyed.

We will no longer entertain individuals who fail to acknowledge the immediate concerns of besieged Syrians in their analysis. Despite reaching out to some of these individuals, they have shown an unwillingness to reflect on the impact of their analysis. We regret that we have no choice left but to cease working with these activists whom we once respected.

We would like to encourage others who are guided by similar principles to do the same.

Abdulla AlShamataan
Abdullah M
Adam Akkad
Adnan Abd Alrahman
Ahmad Al-Sholi
Ahmad Kaki
Ahmad N
Ahmed A
Ala K
Ala’a Salem
Alex T
Ali A. Omar
Amal Ayesh
Amanda Michelle
Amani Alkowni
Ameen Q.
Amena Elmashni
Amira S
Andrew Kadi
Areej
Bashar Subeh
Bayan Abusneineh
Budour Hassan
Butheina Hamdah
Dana Itayem
Dana M
Dania Mukahhal
Dania Mukahhal
Diana J.A.
Dareen Mohamad
Dena E.
Diana Naoum
Dina A.
Dina Moumin
Dorgham Abusalim
Dr. Isam Abu Qasmieh
Eman Abdelhadi
Eyad Mohamed Alkurabi
Eyad Hamid
Farah Saeed
Faran Kharal
Faten Awwad
Fatima El-ghazali
Fouad Halbouni
Hadeel Hejja
Haitham Omar
Haleemah A
Hana Khalil
Hanin Shakrah
Hanna Alshaikh
Hani Barghouthi
Haneen Amra
Hareth Yousef
Hazem Jamjoum
Heba Nimr
Helal Jwayyed
Husam El-Qoulaq
Ibraheem Sumaira
Imran Salha
Jackie Husary
Jannine M
Jehad Abusalim
Jihad Ashkar
Jennifer Mogannam
Joey Husseini Ayoub
Jumana Al-Qawasmi
Karmel Sabri
Kefah Elabed
Khaled B
Laith H
Lama Abu Odeh
Lama Abu Odeh
Lana Barkawi
Lara Abu Ghannam
Leila Abdelrazaq
Lila Suboh
Linah Alsaafin
Lojayn Ottman
Lubna H
Lubna Morrar
Loubna Qutami
Magda Magdy
Mai Nasrallah
Mahmoud Khalil
Maisa Morrar
Majed A
Majed Abuzahriyeh
Manal Abokwidir
Manal El Haj
Maram Kamal
Mariam Saleh
Mariam Barghouti
Mekarem E.
Mariam Abu Samra
Mira Shihadeh
Mohamad Sabbah
Mohammad Al-Ashqar
Mohamed Hassan
Mohammad Abou-Ghazala
Mona N
Msallam Mohammed AbuKhalil
Nadia Ziadat
Nadine H
Nayef Al Smadi
Nidal Bitari
Nour Azzouz
Nour Salman
Nusayba Hammad
Omar Coolaq
Omar Jamal
Osama Mor
Omar Zahzah
Osama Khawaja
Rami Okasha
Rana Asad
Randa MKW
Rani Allan
Rania Salem
Ramzi Issa
Rasha A.
Rawan A.
Rawya Makboul
Reem J
Reem S
Reema A
Riad AlArian
Riya Al-Sanah
Ryah A
Sabreen Ettaher
Salim Salamah
Samar Batrawi
Samar Azzaidani
Sameeha Elwan
Samia S.
Sami J
Sami Shahin
Samya Abu-Orf
Sarah Ghouleh
Sara Zubi
Sarah Abu.
Sarah Ali
Sarah Shahin
Shady Zarka
Seham A
Shifa Alkhatib
Shahrazad Odeh
Shirien D
Sima Dajani
Sonia Farsakh
Susan Al-Suqi
Tahani H.
Taher Herzallah
Talal Alyan
Tamar Ghabin
Tarek Abou-Ghazala
Tareq R
Tasneem Abu-Hejleh
Tawfieq Mousa
Yahiya Saad
Yamila shannan
Yasmeen sh
Yasser Quzz
Yazan Amro
Zaid Muhammad
Zachariah Barghouti
Zeina Labadi

SOAS Palestine Society

 Doc is available here:  https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdFSTpAOCdPRU5e1iP11GDrWPu5pXrdVMzGumApRGd8lil2jQ/viewform

Return to Blogging & from the archives; Gaza and the Mawasi

20 Apr

Have decided to return to blogging/informing despite the extremely disturbing efforts to control information whether about Egypt, Syria, Palestine, the arts.

As Bassem Youssef, heart-surgeon turned comedian said recently:  “You can’t shut people up.”

So why did I fall silent?  Actually I have been active on other forms of social media and got re-involved in music after a hiatus.

I was searching through my files and found this written for the Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on an area of Gaza where people were trapped for years due to Israel’s administrative rules.  I wrote it after traveling to Gaza to observe Israel’s withdrawal, when settlers resisted.  I was with a news crew which filmed settlers attacking a Palestinian home from their roof; the crew and lead (from the Times) said they knew their editor wouldn’t accept the other part of the story … we went into Gaza to talk to various people about their expectations for the future.  Mind you, this predated Hamas’ victory in the elections in ’06.   Recently, I met a man in Arkansas who is from this part of Gaza and he mentioned working in the flower gardens – I had no opportunity to say I had visited.  On several other trips to Gaza, I paused to marvel at the beached boats, unable to fish, although Gaza should rightfully develop a seaport and touristic beach.  As part of the encyclopedia project one struggle was to insert more information on Palestinian geography, history, personalities and perspectives; every brief article counted.  And finally, the point – could Israel’s settlers be forced to withdraw from areas they occupy?  (Yes, almost 4,000 settlers left Gaza, not at all willingly, but they did).     

Al-Muwasi` (meaning gardens) know as Mawasi, is a strip of coastal land on the Gaza Strip, one by fourteen kilometers, divided administratively into the Khan Yunis and Rafah Mawasi. Classified under the Oslo Agreement I of 1994 as a “yellow” area, Israel controlled security, and Palestinians held civil jurisdiction. 760 families (5300 people) inhabit the Khan Yunis Mawasi. 220 families are Palestinian refugees who fled here in 1948. The residents of Malhala are Bedouin refugees, primarily from the Beersheva (Bir Saba`) area.   430 families (3000 persons) live in the Rafah Mawasi including refugees from the Ashdod area who live in the “Swedish village,” part of the Rafah refugee camp.   [Note these figures were current at that time )

At least 15 Israeli settlements were established on Mawasi including Katif, Ganei Tal, Kfar Yam, Neve Dekalim, Gan Or, Bedolah, Rafih Yam and Morag.   In 2005, Mawasi was the site of Israeli demonstrations against withdrawal from Gaza. Demonstrators seized empty buildings and threw stones at Palestinian homes.

The Mawasi Palestinians were not allowed after 1967 to travel to Khan Yunis or Rafah where some have families and property.   Later, they were increasingly restricted due to their proximity to the Israeli Gush Katif settlement to their east. The Gush Katif central administration was based at Neve Dekalim and the area was subjected to special security arrangements.   The Palestinians used to fish, but were forbidden to do so; instead they relied on agriculture. However, since 2000 this output suffered from land-razing and Israeli-imposed transport restrictions. Electricity was available only at night for 5 to 6 hours through a temporary generator. The school lacks electricity, water and sufficient teachers, and its clinic has electricity only 2 hours a day. The Khan Yunis Mawasi has only one private well and no sewage system. The Israeli settlers’ standard of living was considerably higher than the Palestinians as they enjoyed state subsidies and adequate services, well-maintained roads, better residences, and easier access to schools, clinics and supermarkets. Until 2005, there were approximately 3900 Israeli settlers in the area.

Palestinian truck-drivers used to wait for hours to drive through checkpoints.   Only men are allowed to walk through checkpoints on foot and restrictions on gas for cooking and heating were imposed there. Carrying metal through was not allowed, including coins. Of additional concern to Palestinians were incidents of Israeli dumping of toxic waste in the area and the presence of 4 sewage treatment plants serving Israeli settlements, but which pollute Palestinian areas.

Since 2005, a Red Cross project has restored some of the Shanshola boats used to fish sardines.

Sources:

 

B’tselem. Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.

“Al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip: Impossible Life in an Isolated Enclave.” March 2003, pp. 1-21.

 

Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Suffering in Isolation: A Report on Life Under Occupation in the Mawasi Areas in the Gaza Strip, August 2003. pp. 1-125.

 

Personal interviews with al-Muwasi’ residents, July 2005.

 

Sherifa Zuhur, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College