How to Conduct Research Interviews – Sherifa Zuhur

5 Apr

Embarking on Research Interviews

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur


(I want to encourage scholars and students, in the face of severe cuts to academic, scientific and humanities funding, to continue doing interviews, but to learn how in a less teleological manner than I did, when I was a student in Egypt. I’m also a big supporter of free journalism and believe that academics must read journalists, but develop and pursue their own hypotheses. )


You’re writing a paper, a senior thesis, need interviews for your master’s thesis or dissertation. You aren’t a journalism student, you aren’t even comfortable carrying on conversations at a party or during a class break. While interviewing you must adopt a new persona – to the extent that you can — loosen up and act like an old-fashioned bartender or maître d’ who takes the time to get to know his/her customers, asking questions in a friendly manner – but not as pointed as those of the amateur detective. You are a person meeting someone else for the first time (usually) who wants to obtain relevant facts about them and from them. You should practice such conversational interrogation skills with classmates, colleagues, friends, roommates, significant others prior to interviewing. Imitate or channel your elders who swiftly interview unknown guests at family dinners. If you have no-one in your life to help you with this, then you should at least rehearse your questions once you develop them (see below).


Whether you have excellent social skills or not, you’ve demonstrated your intelligence and perseverance in your coursework, and these qualities will assist you in the interview process. Your first step is to prepare yourself to describe yourself and your research very succinctly and clearly in one or two sentences. You must describe yourself so your subjects understand your positionality vis a vis the topic. I am from country X, at university X, in X major, my advisor is X (many people won’t know or care who this is, but a few might).  Some respondents will want to know how you speak the language. Explain. I took X many years of language X, or I learned it as a child.


**** Oops! So you think you’re going to do interviews without knowing the language of your respondents? Yes, you can, but it will be difficult. You can bring a translator (but you’ll be relying on their interpretation). If your language skills are sub-par, then explain to your respondent that you want to interview them in English, but be prepared with an accurate version of your questions in the relevant language.****


Rejection of an Interview Opportunity If you are a foreigner, you may then receive a curt rejection. “I don’t speak to Americans.” Or as I did “I don’t speak to anyone at an American university.” Somehow you must phrase your request so that it becomes a desirable invitation. You can mention that you’ve spoken to another interviewee, or persons in nearby town X. Or, “Well, I could write the topic without doing interviews, but I want to know what people really think, instead of taking Western reporters’ views as the only perspective.”   You can add, “If you aren’t interested, do you know someone else who will speak with me” (And if they agree, you should also ask them about other possible interviewees if you want multiple interviews and are using the snowballing method).   If they are dead-set against being interviewed, then politely apologize and continue on to the next prospect.


Purpose of Your Interviews.

You must explain to your interview subjects what you’re doing and also why you are interviewing them. You cannot set out in a fog of theoretical prefacing; saying that you are contextualizing your subject as many of your interlocutors won’t understand that, nor will your readers. I recognize this is more difficult for some types of interviews than for others and that history students keen to avoid teleological methodology may not do very well here – because interview material SHOULD help you form and state hypotheses. But you cannot fish blindly – so try rephrasing your main research question in the form of a purpose, i.e.


(drawing from my own field interviews)


  1. a)   I am trying to find out how much of an impact Hizbullah had on residents’ lives in this area.


  1. b) I want to know what women think about Islamist ideology on gender.


  1. c) what if there is a war with Iran – what will happen to oil facilities?


  1. a) was acceptable but a more neutral introductory question was

I want to know how the war has affected the lives of people in this area (the area chosen is where HZB dominates, although not in the entire area) – granted, I did that research in ’99 and the hawadith, the pseudonymic, apologetic term for the war, were still an important trope of political/social orientation.


  1. b) is a fail – because I had to construct a model of Islamist ideology on gender FROM my respondents’ visions and reactions.   But everyone I spoke to aimed towards a positive or negative interpretation of Islamism & was concerned that I was representing the opposite of whatever they thought.


Here were other ways of getting at that:


b revised) I want to know if the Islamiyyun (because Islamists was a disputed term then) are affecting society/women/politics …. I used all 3 of these terms.


  1. c) was fine when addressed to CEOs, upper level officials, but made others inappropriately nervous.


After you plan how to describe your research – then ask yourself what you hope to uncover, or reveal (the verb I used in my own first book title) through the interview process.  Do not decide on your findings before you obtain them!


You may have multiple purposes – you may wish to understand your interlocutors social, economic or political status. That goes into the profile you construct of interviewees prior to research questions to be asked of many – if you are doing multiple interviews. If it’s a single interview, then this information is still quite important.    If you are developing a structured interview, then these questions pertaining to profile will help you in any quantification – of age/background etc. to particular attitudes for ex.


This requires some background research on your own part. Look the person up on the Web, review any statements by or about them, and birthdate, place, education, known associations, employment. Familiarize yourself with micro-areas, villages, towns, suburbs. Go visit them if possible and try to find out what they were like at the time your respondent was growing up. You may well say, oh Sherifa, you could take the buses all over Syria at the time you lived there, but I can’t do that. At least make an effort to know the physical, social, and political ‘location’ of your respondent for ex. that Giza was once quite individual villages which now appear to blend together as empty spaces were filled in – and that their inhabitants included important families A, B or C. Don’t leave this background information out, telling yourself that you’re not an anthropologist and you don’t need it. You most certainly must combine the roles of anthropologist, historian, police investigator, general snoop dog on your subject, and learn to discern accurate information from gossip along the way.


If you can’t visit these places, make that part of the interview – it’s usually useful to know your subject’s perception of his/her own environment and how and when your subject became conscious of his/her own social location.


Here’s a good general reading on interviews –


Please note, he presents the option of an open-ended interview as if it is ‘unstructured.’ In oral history, the open-ended interview is a desirable path, but it need not be unstructured. Rather, you add on questions to encourage your respondent to keep speaking when they become engaged in the conversation with you. In oral history, one guideline is to ask “historically relevant” questions. You are seeking a bigger picture, not simply chronically the life or thoughts of an individual.


Many of these guidelines are relevant


However, if you aren’t an oral historian, some of this isn’t relevant. You are responsible for clarifying the situation of ownership over the material of the interview itself. You aren’t required to give your materials to a repository (I didn’t, but wish I had) but you may wish to do that if you see that others could benefit from this material.


How Many Interviews? Another interesting possibility is to interview multiple subjects who necessarily view one event or experience differently than others. For example, you might be interviewing people of one faction or group opposed to another, or whose families fought one another, or who were part of the same organization or institute, and yet had decidedly different experiences.   Then, a ‘history’ becomes the meeting point of differing perceptions of an event, and its impact.


Your field, finances, time and access may determine how many interviews you carry out. More is not necessarily better. Perhaps your research focuses on a single figure, those who knew that figure, or you plan to publish the interview in full – which will necessarily limit the number of interviews. If you’re studying a philosopher, or a theorist, for example, you might only research that individual. You might submit questions in advance to an interviewee, but then expect more polished and less spontaneous responses.   In this case, it seems the researcher had read an early (1993) interview of Butler, but should perhaps have informed her in advance of her questions.   (See where Butler says she doesn’t remember, doesn’t reread her own work) Yet there is value in her response on performativity.


If you are in sociology, economics, or politics, you may need to select a representative sample and the size must relate to the total size and composition of your topic, or population. A recent study of Syria’s millions of refugees used a sample of only 130 people, and acknowledged that it wasn’t representative, but nonetheless issues recommendations on the basis of the information. Any large study will more likely require a questionnaire and you must decide if you are additionally interviewing in order to obtain qualitative as well quantifiable responses.  Snowballing is another method – just acknowledge your use of this method.   Public opinion surveys aren’t the same as research interviews! Treat the material accordingly.


Questions  The next step is to formulate questions. In a qualitative interview, you want to use open-ended questions; those which cannot be answered by a mere ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ If respondents answer with a yes or a no, you need to rethink and then reformulate the question.   As my research combined sociology with history, political science and also religion, I frequently failed in this effort. For example, in one questionnaire (which I memorized) I asked “Should Egypt be an Islamic state?” To my dismay, all of my respondents answered that it was an Islamic state and tended not to elaborate on that & we then got off-track discussing Saudi Arabia or Iran. On the one hand, that in itself was informative on their views of Wahhabism, revolutionary Iranian Islamism, and their opinions that Egypt wasn’t similar.

Try to cleanse your questions of pre-formed judgments which ‘lead’ the interviewee. For example, don’t say “You have a reputation for being very controversial,” but instead formulate a question about the source of that controversy … i.e. “you wrote a book on the non-existence of God .. what was the immediate or later response to it?”


Obtain permission from your respondents. Use a release form with a signature or obtain their oral permission. Depending on your field, topic or goals, you may be concealing or including their names. I found that promising and holding to anonymity was extremely useful in interviews of individuals who fear oversight by their countries’ security apparatuses. But in other cases, I interviewed officials or leaders who could either speak freely, or not, however it was understood their names would be used.   It is understood that in academic research, the lens and opinion of the researcher determines how material should be presented. Some members of the general public don’t understand this. You may encounter individuals who won’t allow you to publish their views unless you show them the quote, or section on them prior to publication. This is NOT the preferred journalistic or academic standard as it encourages self-censorship, censorship or promotion of that individual’s stand or position to the detriment of your own. Be careful here! If you want to interview a president in office or a CEO by name, expect such an outcome, or be prepared for some sort of negative response post-interview – it may happen, or not.   As an academic, you only have a responsibility to correctly convey your own insights. You are not bound, as I was, in DoD to correctly interpret national security policy (which is itself, often vague and therefore more open than one might think).


Now here’s where your rehearsal or practice session comes in – ask some version of these questions to your roommate – or if you can, a classmate. Yes, I know your roommate doesn’t know anything about X – but he does know about some other matter/event/person. Also practice reading your questions aloud and try to eliminate sub-clauses and extremely complex terms. You should not sound as if you’re reading, but speaking with your respondent. You also want to practice recording an interview, either on an I-Phone notes, IPod, or an old fashioned recorder – make sure you know how to start, stop and review.  Yes, you want a recording! E-questions or those submitted in writing lack the same authenticity and tone of recorded or in-person interviews. You can hear emotion (or lack thereof) in your respondent’s voice. He or she may get angry. That’s important too. Back off. Apologize and start over. Or don’t apologize, but just shift gears into a new topic area, make up a different question.  In a written questionnaire, the problem is that your formal phrasing provides a shortcut – a highly educated respondent will be able to respond with some text you can use immediately, but you won’t have learned or sensed what your respondent thinks about the question.


When your respondent is especially animated about something, ask a second question, or just say “can you tell me more about that?” When you complete your questions, ask your respondent if s/he would like to add anything, or invite them to speak on something that you might have skipped over before.



Here I want to paraphrase and cite Marlyn Tadros from her chapter on humor, Twitter & the revolution from our forthcoming book on Egypt:   After Egypt’s revolution, Hazem Isma’il was his party’s favorite to run for president (but he was bypassed from this opportunity because his mother was a U.S. citizen). He answered every journalistic question with the very American phrasing “I’m so happy you asked me that question, and then blah, blah.” People made fun of this tendency as it seemed that he did this to give himself a second to answer the question which he certainly wasn’t prepared to answer. She quotes a series of tweets on this such as:


@M7mdAboSoliman iwaa tisma’a lihad yo[q]illak fi bidayat kalamuh ana sa’id innak sa’altni al-sua’al da. Ummu amrikiya [don’t listen to anyone who begins his sentence with ‘I am happy you asked me this question’. His mother is American.][i]


The irony to some Egyptians was this salafi leader’s pretense at authenticity though he had this American styling (and it did not help that it was revealed that he had plastic surgery to alter his nose).


You may interview a dissembler or a distractor – the Distractor may stall on a question or actually ignore your question and then begin speechifying on his/her own favorite topic or a point that he/she wishes to make. Let him do this. Then ask the question again.


Perils of Outside Interference in Your Questions. To newbies who use fixers. (For journalists, and some traveling researchers, a fixer is a person – sometimes, a local journalist — who is hired to help arrange an interview, or the entire story. This person may drive you, guide you, translate and will suggest interviewees to whom s/he has access) Don’t let your fixer suggest questions in the interview; you need to shape your own interview. Yes, you will have conversations with the fixers in which they are trying to determine what you want to know. I should probably write another blog entry about using fixers as the important differences between journalism and academic research play in here; and also the topic of keeping safe while interviewing.


Sometimes another person attends the interview, a relative, a cohort or colleague of the individual you are interviewing and that person may interrupt or attempt to lead the interview in a different direction. Just let them know you’ll be happy to hear their comments as soon as you conclude your questions.


Other Problems. You may run into a person who is or is not an academic, but feels ownership over the topic and who may give you trouble, or even threaten you during or following an interview. If you are a student, alert your professor or dissertation supervisor of any such a threat, but know that the respondent has no right to threaten you, particularly if they agreed to meet with you or be interviewed in the first place. Don’t let people with psychological problems or jealousy derail your efforts, or radically change the course of your research.


Several of us have experienced this with regard to closed movements – religious movements which try to control information about the group in question. It’s fine to shift gears and use secondary sources, or seek a different respondent if this particular person gives you trouble.


Or, maybe you start out in an interview and it disintegrates for some different reason. You may want to apologize to the respondent and just call it a day. If you are a single woman do be professional, and yet aware that male respondents might flirt or act unprofessionally in an interview setting. It may help if someone else is present, but that might not be possible.


Post-Interview.   Make written notes prior to transcribing your interview. Where it took place, what time and date, any special circumstances (terrible storm, gunfire made some of my interviews memorable – were other people present). Then write out the profile information you’ve gathered.


Next, a useful technique is to make headings on 3 x 5 cards – especially if you have multiple interviews, but also otherwise. What stood out to you? What did you hear that you hadn’t even imagined or thought about prior to the interview? For example, I wrote one heading under ‘PR’ for a theme in a leader’s interview in which he complained about not being able to speak to Americans and I had played along saying – “Ok, if you could, what would you say?” Was he propagandizing to me, or responding to a previous interview? I had to decide how to interpret this information.


Analyze what you learned from the interview. This process may take longer than you think.   You may decide you need additional interviews, or to narrow or broaden your approach to the topic. For example if I couldn’t interview people who were contemporaries with a particular figure, I might decide to write about another contemporary or rival of his in the same piece. What have you learned from this primary source – interview responses that you weren’t aware of? Can you limit this to a series of key findings? What if your respondent presented nothing new or unexpected? Did he or she verify any key fact for you?


Decide where to directly quote your interviewee and where to paraphrase. If your respondents have said they MUST see the material before you publish (you are highly advised NOT to offer such review) then you must contact them prior.   In such cases, the use of anonymity or partial anonymity is quite useful.


Re-read your secondary sources and other primary sources on the topic.   Maybe something from your interviews is reflected or hinted at here and you will notice it. Do this after completing or at least embarking on your analysis so you won’t be so influenced by pre-existing analyses.


For the Quantifiers. Re-check the neutrality of your phrasing. Run your numbers and consider what the interesting correlations mean. People under 30 think X but people over 50 think Y? Yes, that’s important. I was warned that people wouldn’t be interested in my data, but I devoted a chapter of my dissertation to it anyway and I’m glad I did as it illustrated a growing trend that many sought to deny.   However, be prepared to summarize your findings for those who don’t want to read the nuances or complications in that data.


Visuals. What about documentaries or research questions which are part of a video project? Here, you need to more carefully edit your questions with your audience in mind. Ideally you could tape more than one session and then edit down to your needs. Your product will be more of a cameo of the interviewee than is the case in a standard interview & you have to think about it visually. Yes, you can conduct a ‘talking heads’ interview, but it is much more appealing to present an interviewee in the context of the subject of the interview or in his/her residence, along with something meaningful to them. It depends whether your primary aim is as a videographer or an academic; and you may choose to introduce other materials, photographs etc.   A useful course, or part of a course could be taught by professional filmmakers/videographers along with academics as their intentions differ.


If you don’t use video, consider taking a photograph of your interviewee if s/he agrees (and remember if it was an anonymous interview, you can’t use this without permission).


Citation   Your interviews are primary sources. As such they should be listed separately in your bibliography or reference list. The source is the respondent, not you – don’t list them under your last name (unless your publisher requires you to do so). If you have promised anonymity, then the form is Personal Interview with Mr. X, give the location and date, or Personal interview by the author/your full name with Mr. X.


Never, never, never falsify this information!   Journalists and academics who do so are committing an intellectual crime.


If you feel that oral information is important, but this wasn’t a true interview, then use the format: Personal communication by Full Name of Respondent on date and the method (telephone, email, or the location if it was in person).


[i] Abu Sulaiman, [M7mdAboSoliman] October 23, 2012, accessed, December 18, 2016,

The Islamic State’s Threats to Voters in ’16 US Elections

7 Nov

Sherifa Zuhur

I was asked to give my comments on ‘Caliph’ al-Baghdadi’s recent audiotape and also ISIS’ statement on U.S. elections. I’ll start with the second, much easier task.

ISIS oppose elections in the U.S. and more importantly it opposes democracy in any Islamic society and the idealized Islamic state – the Caliphate.  Their latest document provides the doctrinal reasons for doing so.  While there might be political rationale for changing positions on this question (as did the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas), the Islamic State will pursue, to the bitter end, the religious justifications for arguing against a democratic, populist form of government (one which would unseat authoritarian modes of government, such as their own).

Their argument against voters participation in the U.S. election is firstly:

that both sides – GOP and Democrats – are inimical to the interests of Islam and Muslims.

Here is a translation of the document.  Walking through it provides little novelty to those familiar with the group, but there might be some surprises for those who don’t read texts.

IS  directs their argument in these initial arguments to/about Muslims by calling such elections an ‘apostate’ vote.  Thus the Gore-Bush election and that of Obama were also acts of apostasy.  They are especially bitter to former mujahid/neosalafi Safar Hawali who has spoken out against jihadism on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government (you can look him up in works on extremism in Saudi Arabia).  But also towards Muslims who voted for Bush in Florida

Similarly “murtaddin” (renouncers of Islam and thus apostates) are the MuslimBrotherhood and “sister sects” who support participation in the U.S. elections and have done so for other elections, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Palestine.

ISIS say the only difference between Hilary Clinton and Trump is that the former is more skilled in political correctness.

ISIS is fiercely opposed to feminism (it would not acknowledge being anti-woman) and opposes Hilary as a “female feminist” & cites the well-known hadith “Never shall a people who give their leadership to a woman be successful.” (incidentally, this was a reference to the daughter of a Sassanian ruler).

#ISIS states that both Trump & HRC “committed themselves to the Jewish state” – meaning Israel, as indeed, have nearly all U.S. candidates, not only for president, but other positions.

The group condemns the outcome of elections by commenting on President Obama’s actions in the Muslim world – his invasion of Iraq & Sham, interference in Libya, his drone strikes Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia.

The Islamic State regards  HRC  as the more dangerous candidate — she is  able to lead more Muslims astray (into apostasy) by exploiting the notion of a liberal Islam or moderate Muslims.  To this they contrast Trump’s (or his advisors) definition of radical Islam as being distinct from Islam.  They write that he needs to understand that their proposals ARE Islam itself (which is ironically, the attack of right-wing analysts on all Muslims).

The group shows its intentions of not only attacking the legitimacy of elections but the rhetorical and  ‘false divisions’ of Muslims that have been created by Western (and also some Muslim) politicians, media and analysis.

If anything, this document shows that the Islamic state and all its ilk, whether al-Qa’ida offshoots or the #Jihad 3.0 variant of ISIS that may emerge in a few years, will always oppose Western-style democracy & its imposition or growth in Islamic lands.

The next doctrinally-based argument is to decry all that which is not based on Shari’ah; and all who accept  human-made legislation, judges, rulers who impose it – as tawaghit.

ISIS underscores its uncompromising view of tawhid — the single and sole authority of Allah —  in this document and aims to associate the Western or democratic vision of Islamic world with sin and apostasy.

The document goes on to condemn those who are affiliates or associates in apostasy; and who fail to act against it, as apostates.  Thereby it condemns ideal of popular legislation and voter participation as ‘ar-rida bi-kufr, kufr’;  silent consent in apostasy is apostasy.

It condemns those who ‘fight’ for the supporters of apostate democracy (which could mean the Sunni soldiers of the Iraqi Defense Forces) or any supporters of the U.S. and all those allies of Christians & Jews — a much widern net.

“Fear of deportation and abuse” is not an excuse for association with kufr  (apostasy) or Christians or Jews (This could be seen as a reference to Trump’s campaign and the urging of U.S. Muslim organizations to get out and vote against a candidate who threatens their presence in the United States.

ISIS writes that although one could argue this is coercion, the proper response to coercion is hijrah or flight (to an Islamic state) but not association with apostasy or its support.

The document makes many allusions to the early Muslims who betrayed the Muslims; and states that when angels seize sinners’ souls, they will ask didn’t they have the opportunity to emigrate (wasn’t the world sufficiently broad for them to take another alternative) instead of committing apostasy.

ISIS warns that even those with good intentions — for example to defend Muslims — who commit shirk, will be punished.

The document then states that given all of these preceding proofs, it is licit, and indeed obligatory to kill all those participating in the US apostate elections, for they are renegade apostates or Crusaders.

The language here is clearly directed at the popular electoral process:  “Say O Disbelievers, we do not worship the people”.

The Islamic State makes it clear that it is threatening threat  “Crusader” voters as well including women, who aren’t merely married and subjugated to their husband’s vote, they are voting on their own.  This may seem a bit of an obscure reference, but it pertains to the waging of violence on women.

The document concludes by asking Allah to wreak calamity on US election day like none other in American’s “pathetic history.” So does this mean that ISIS has planned violent actions?  It may have, and it would be foolish to assume that any intended by “lone wolves” might not be connected to IS Western-targeted planning departments.

In sum, this document illustrates the Islamic State’s uncompromising insistence that its Caliphate represents true Muslims – as compared to nation states & democratization even in the face of the group’s assured defeat in  Mosul and following that in Raqqa.

President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s Impact on Egypt – Sherifa Zuhur

21 Oct


I was asked to communicate President al-Sisi’s impact on Egypt by a journalist, who said he intended to put my responses into an article for the Wall Street Journal (9/8/16).  As far as I know, it wasn’t printed, but there were a few other similar pieces which came out at that time which were highly critical, if not condemnations of Egypt.  I assumed that my responses did not please the editors, but I thought they might interest you!

– President Sisi’s most important and potentially lasting effects on Egypt are:


  1. Imbuing in Egyptians the sense that their President (and therefore their other officials and institutions) must be accountable to them; justify policies and meet their needs. The President began a series of public addresses which were essentially follow-ups/report cards on specific issues. This was despite the fact that he cannot (and one would not expect him to be able to) summarize all of the forward and retrograde currents; and the fact that in certain instances those dealing with fraud were then prosecuted by the state.


  1. As Defense Minister and then President, he moved – at the public’s and the military leadership’s behest — against the oldest, strongest Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, Freedom and Justice. Here, Egypt’s path diverged from other nations impacted by the Arab Spring. It would be grandstanding to say that Egypt has by these means chosen a secular state, because its legal system is only semi-secular and one must acknowledge the support of certain salafi groups for the current government. This meant there is a check to the Muslim Brotherhood/Freedom & Justice Party’s longstanding animosity to Egypt’s Copts, and ambiguous attitude toward’s women’s rights and other human and intellectual rights. It meant that President Morsi’s language which indicated that his tribe or ‘people’ were Islamists and Brethren and not all Egyptians was unsuccessful. This course of action meant his presiding over a purge which impacted liberals and youth as well as Islamists, and however popular with an internal majority, has been sharply criticized outside of the country.


  1. Sisi has presided over the most active counterterrorism campaign(s) in the country’s history for some decades, and the main impetus of that campaign — in the northern Sinai — has been fiercely fought. By and large, the situation in the rest of Egypt has been stabilized.

As a response to this problem and the resistance funded or supported by the Islamists discussed in (b), he has unfortunately curtailed Egyptians political rights by not altering the so-called protest law (107 of ’13 approved under acting Pres. Mansour). Parliament’s upholding of this law, and approval of many laws and edicts introduced in the absence of a legislature is one of the obstacles impeding better relations between Egypt’s highly divided liberals and government supporters. In the long term, a movement towards expressions of political freedom (which do not endanger others or destroy property and cause havoc as was seen on campuses and in the streets) and away from the use of military courts would be highly desirable. It seems that Egypt was unable to establish a direction for its policies free of these political limits despite the revolution, and admission that Egyptian political rights prior to it were insufficient.


  1. President Sisi faced a huge challenge in stabilizing and selecting projects and policies to move the country forward economically. His oversight of several grand projects – the ‘second’ or additional Suez Canal, the new administrative capitol city, and the medical city, among them — will at least temporarily employ many Egyptians in their construction. These should help improve Suez trade and decentralization in the future; the more immediate economic stabilizer is the $12 billion IMF loan. Other imperatives to ameliorate the rising cost of living, un- and under- employment and failing public utilities and service have presented challenges. Foreign direct investment may rise, but it is still a difficult road for investors, and President Sisi’s government has reviewed the exchange rate policy and adjusted currency rates (another adjustment may be required); and tried, but not yet addressed ambiguous tax policies. Foreign direct investment still presents many obstacles and restrictions to would-be investors.


Leveling austerity measures on Egypt’s large poor and almost-poor population is very unpopular. Such measures were unpopular in the UK, but the public’s safety net is stronger. Outbursts on social media show the strength of popular resentment that the current government has neither brought “bread” – nor dignity, freedom and an end to corruption (the ideals of the January 25th, 2011 revolution).


  1. Pres. Sisi impressed me and others as knowing and understanding how far Egypt had to travel to democracy and wrote, as you know in his SRP in 2006, some observations about the potential to and obstacles in the way of democracy in the Arab Islamic world. To this end, I personally was hoping he would make good his promises to improve Egypt’s educational system, which is in very dire straits, and to address the hype and problems with academic and intellectual freedom in Egypt.   The latter is not helped by the conspiratorial tone of the media seeing “foreign hands” here, there and everywhere. But the media reflects a lack of critical thought, which in turn, can only be addressed with standards of tolerance, which must be introduced in and throughout the educational system.


If he does so, I hope that new policies will not direct thousands of low-income students to vocational schools as seems to have developed out of the not-fully-realized state socialist policies of the past. I believe Pres. Sisi himself is an egalitarian, but much depends on who may advise and craft reform of that nature.


  1. President Sisi has upheld the framework of the Camp David Accords. A further large-scale war would be disastrous for Egypt, but on the other hand it remains to be seen if he can move forward peace between the Palestinians and Israel. He had encouraged meetings between Israel and the Palestinians to be hosted by Russia, and presented a plan to President Abbas recently which offers land in the Sinai to add to the PA territory in Gaza. Abbas has rejected this plan outright, and Sisi has run the risk of being accused of giving away Egyptian land (as in the Tiran/Sanafir islands uproar).   But the offer indicates a proactive dimension to President Sisi’s leadership which might bear more fruit on this issue in the future.


On other regional matters, Egypt’s government has engaged with Ethiopia since the building of the Renaissance Dam – which could threaten the Nile’s water supply which is crucial to Egypt and the Sudan– began. It has rather inexplicably and irrationally backed Assad’s government in Syria, but stated that its support is for fighting terrorism. However, since the huge numbers of Syrian casualties and displacement indicate that the rebellion is not, in fact a matter of terrorism, but a strongly supported aim at regime change — one must be aware of Egypt’s fear that a post-Assad government would bring to power Islamists unfriendly to it, or more specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood. President Sisi’s generally good relations with Saudi Arabia have been ruffled by their differences on Syria, and current economic problems in the Kingdom, but Saudi-Egyptian ties are likely to remain close.

Palestinians Rebut Blumenthal & Other Critics of Syria’s Revolution

12 Oct
On The Allies We’re Not Proud Of: A Palestinian Response to Troubling Discourse on Syria
We, the undersigned Palestinians, write to affirm our commitment to the amplification of Syrian voices as they endure slaughter and displacement at the hands of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. We are motivated by our deep belief that oppression, in all of its manifestations, should be the primary concern of anyone committed to our collective liberation. Our vision of liberation includes the emancipation of all oppressed peoples, regardless of whether or not their struggles fit neatly into outdated geopolitical frameworks.We are concerned by some of the discourse that has emerged from progressive circles with regards to the ongoing crisis in Syria. In particular, we are embarrassed by the ways in which some individuals known for their work on Palestine have failed to account for some crucial context in their analysis of Syria.

The Syrian revolution was in fact a natural response to 40 years of authoritarian rule. The Assad regime, with the support of its foreign financial and military backers, is attempting to preserve its power at the expense of the millions of Syrians whom the regime has exiled, imprisoned, and massacred. We believe that minimizing this context in any discussion of Syria dismisses the value of Syrian self-determination and undermines the legitimacy of their uprising.

We also believe that an important consequence of all foreign interventions, including those purportedly done on behalf of the uprising, has been the setback of the original demands of revolution. The revolution is a victim, not a product, of these interventions. It is imperative for any analysis of Syria to recognize this fundamental premise. We cannot erase the agency of Syrians struggling for liberation, no matter how many players are actively working against them.

Though we maintain that the phenomenon of foreign aid demands thorough critique, we are concerned by the ways in which foreign aid has been weaponized to cast suspicion on Syrian humanitarian efforts. Foreign aid is not unique to Syria; it is prevalent in Palestine as well. We reject the notion that just because an organization is receiving foreign aid, it must follow then that that organization is partaking in some shadowy Western-backed conspiracy. Such nonsense has the effect of both undermining humanitarian efforts while simultaneously whitewashing the very crimes against humanity that necessitated the aid in the first place.

Furthermore, we object to the casual adoption of “war on terror” language. Enemies of liberation have historically used this rhetoric to target humanitarians, organizers, and community members. From Muhammad Salah to the Midwest 23 to the Holy Land Five, our community is all too familiar with the very real consequence of employing a “war on terror” framework. Therefore, we reject a discourse that perpetuates these old tactics and peddles harmful and unwarranted suspicion against Syrians.

Along these lines, it is our position that any discussion of Syria that neglects the central role of Bashar Al-Assad and his regime in the destruction of Syria directly contradicts the principles of solidarity by which we abide. We have reflected on our own tendency to heroize those who advocate on behalf of the Palestinian struggle, and we fear that some members of our community may have prioritized the celebrity status of these individuals over the respect and support we owe to those Syrians affected most directly by the war, as well as those living in the diaspora whose voices have been dismissed as they have watched their homeland be destroyed.

We will no longer entertain individuals who fail to acknowledge the immediate concerns of besieged Syrians in their analysis. Despite reaching out to some of these individuals, they have shown an unwillingness to reflect on the impact of their analysis. We regret that we have no choice left but to cease working with these activists whom we once respected.

We would like to encourage others who are guided by similar principles to do the same.

Abdulla AlShamataan
Abdullah M
Adam Akkad
Adnan Abd Alrahman
Ahmad Al-Sholi
Ahmad Kaki
Ahmad N
Ahmed A
Ala K
Ala’a Salem
Alex T
Ali A. Omar
Amal Ayesh
Amanda Michelle
Amani Alkowni
Ameen Q.
Amena Elmashni
Amira S
Andrew Kadi
Bashar Subeh
Bayan Abusneineh
Budour Hassan
Butheina Hamdah
Dana Itayem
Dana M
Dania Mukahhal
Dania Mukahhal
Diana J.A.
Dareen Mohamad
Dena E.
Diana Naoum
Dina A.
Dina Moumin
Dorgham Abusalim
Dr. Isam Abu Qasmieh
Eman Abdelhadi
Eyad Mohamed Alkurabi
Eyad Hamid
Farah Saeed
Faran Kharal
Faten Awwad
Fatima El-ghazali
Fouad Halbouni
Hadeel Hejja
Haitham Omar
Haleemah A
Hana Khalil
Hanin Shakrah
Hanna Alshaikh
Hani Barghouthi
Haneen Amra
Hareth Yousef
Hazem Jamjoum
Heba Nimr
Helal Jwayyed
Husam El-Qoulaq
Ibraheem Sumaira
Imran Salha
Jackie Husary
Jannine M
Jehad Abusalim
Jihad Ashkar
Jennifer Mogannam
Joey Husseini Ayoub
Jumana Al-Qawasmi
Karmel Sabri
Kefah Elabed
Khaled B
Laith H
Lama Abu Odeh
Lama Abu Odeh
Lana Barkawi
Lara Abu Ghannam
Leila Abdelrazaq
Lila Suboh
Linah Alsaafin
Lojayn Ottman
Lubna H
Lubna Morrar
Loubna Qutami
Magda Magdy
Mai Nasrallah
Mahmoud Khalil
Maisa Morrar
Majed A
Majed Abuzahriyeh
Manal Abokwidir
Manal El Haj
Maram Kamal
Mariam Saleh
Mariam Barghouti
Mekarem E.
Mariam Abu Samra
Mira Shihadeh
Mohamad Sabbah
Mohammad Al-Ashqar
Mohamed Hassan
Mohammad Abou-Ghazala
Mona N
Msallam Mohammed AbuKhalil
Nadia Ziadat
Nadine H
Nayef Al Smadi
Nidal Bitari
Nour Azzouz
Nour Salman
Nusayba Hammad
Omar Coolaq
Omar Jamal
Osama Mor
Omar Zahzah
Osama Khawaja
Rami Okasha
Rana Asad
Randa MKW
Rani Allan
Rania Salem
Ramzi Issa
Rasha A.
Rawan A.
Rawya Makboul
Reem J
Reem S
Reema A
Riad AlArian
Riya Al-Sanah
Ryah A
Sabreen Ettaher
Salim Salamah
Samar Batrawi
Samar Azzaidani
Sameeha Elwan
Samia S.
Sami J
Sami Shahin
Samya Abu-Orf
Sarah Ghouleh
Sara Zubi
Sarah Abu.
Sarah Ali
Sarah Shahin
Shady Zarka
Seham A
Shifa Alkhatib
Shahrazad Odeh
Shirien D
Sima Dajani
Sonia Farsakh
Susan Al-Suqi
Tahani H.
Taher Herzallah
Talal Alyan
Tamar Ghabin
Tarek Abou-Ghazala
Tareq R
Tasneem Abu-Hejleh
Tawfieq Mousa
Yahiya Saad
Yamila shannan
Yasmeen sh
Yasser Quzz
Yazan Amro
Zaid Muhammad
Zachariah Barghouti
Zeina Labadi

SOAS Palestine Society

 Doc is available here:

Return to Blogging & from the archives; Gaza and the Mawasi

20 Apr

Have decided to return to blogging/informing despite the extremely disturbing efforts to control information whether about Egypt, Syria, Palestine, the arts.

As Bassem Youssef, heart-surgeon turned comedian said recently:  “You can’t shut people up.”

So why did I fall silent?  Actually I have been active on other forms of social media and got re-involved in music after a hiatus.

I was searching through my files and found this written for the Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on an area of Gaza where people were trapped for years due to Israel’s administrative rules.  I wrote it after traveling to Gaza to observe Israel’s withdrawal, when settlers resisted.  I was with a news crew which filmed settlers attacking a Palestinian home from their roof; the crew and lead (from the Times) said they knew their editor wouldn’t accept the other part of the story … we went into Gaza to talk to various people about their expectations for the future.  Mind you, this predated Hamas’ victory in the elections in ’06.   Recently, I met a man in Arkansas who is from this part of Gaza and he mentioned working in the flower gardens – I had no opportunity to say I had visited.  On several other trips to Gaza, I paused to marvel at the beached boats, unable to fish, although Gaza should rightfully develop a seaport and touristic beach.  As part of the encyclopedia project one struggle was to insert more information on Palestinian geography, history, personalities and perspectives; every brief article counted.  And finally, the point – could Israel’s settlers be forced to withdraw from areas they occupy?  (Yes, almost 4,000 settlers left Gaza, not at all willingly, but they did).     

Al-Muwasi` (meaning gardens) know as Mawasi, is a strip of coastal land on the Gaza Strip, one by fourteen kilometers, divided administratively into the Khan Yunis and Rafah Mawasi. Classified under the Oslo Agreement I of 1994 as a “yellow” area, Israel controlled security, and Palestinians held civil jurisdiction. 760 families (5300 people) inhabit the Khan Yunis Mawasi. 220 families are Palestinian refugees who fled here in 1948. The residents of Malhala are Bedouin refugees, primarily from the Beersheva (Bir Saba`) area.   430 families (3000 persons) live in the Rafah Mawasi including refugees from the Ashdod area who live in the “Swedish village,” part of the Rafah refugee camp.   [Note these figures were current at that time )

At least 15 Israeli settlements were established on Mawasi including Katif, Ganei Tal, Kfar Yam, Neve Dekalim, Gan Or, Bedolah, Rafih Yam and Morag.   In 2005, Mawasi was the site of Israeli demonstrations against withdrawal from Gaza. Demonstrators seized empty buildings and threw stones at Palestinian homes.

The Mawasi Palestinians were not allowed after 1967 to travel to Khan Yunis or Rafah where some have families and property.   Later, they were increasingly restricted due to their proximity to the Israeli Gush Katif settlement to their east. The Gush Katif central administration was based at Neve Dekalim and the area was subjected to special security arrangements.   The Palestinians used to fish, but were forbidden to do so; instead they relied on agriculture. However, since 2000 this output suffered from land-razing and Israeli-imposed transport restrictions. Electricity was available only at night for 5 to 6 hours through a temporary generator. The school lacks electricity, water and sufficient teachers, and its clinic has electricity only 2 hours a day. The Khan Yunis Mawasi has only one private well and no sewage system. The Israeli settlers’ standard of living was considerably higher than the Palestinians as they enjoyed state subsidies and adequate services, well-maintained roads, better residences, and easier access to schools, clinics and supermarkets. Until 2005, there were approximately 3900 Israeli settlers in the area.

Palestinian truck-drivers used to wait for hours to drive through checkpoints.   Only men are allowed to walk through checkpoints on foot and restrictions on gas for cooking and heating were imposed there. Carrying metal through was not allowed, including coins. Of additional concern to Palestinians were incidents of Israeli dumping of toxic waste in the area and the presence of 4 sewage treatment plants serving Israeli settlements, but which pollute Palestinian areas.

Since 2005, a Red Cross project has restored some of the Shanshola boats used to fish sardines.



B’tselem. Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.

“Al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip: Impossible Life in an Isolated Enclave.” March 2003, pp. 1-21.


Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Suffering in Isolation: A Report on Life Under Occupation in the Mawasi Areas in the Gaza Strip, August 2003. pp. 1-125.


Personal interviews with al-Muwasi’ residents, July 2005.


Sherifa Zuhur, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College


Security, Sinai, Terrorism #Egypt Aug. 18 – Oct. 2, 2015 Sherifa Zuhur

3 Oct

Oct. 2 New message by #WilayatSinai:  “From #Sinai to #Somalia – #ISIS #Egypt


Oct. 2  #IS#Sinai claims it killed an #Egypt-ian “army spy” a member of the Sawarka tribe in Cairo. This is first Sinai-based claim on Cairo attack in 2015.


Oct. 2 A ban on niqab worn by instructors and professors at Cairo University is upheld by Egypt’s Mufti. (Ban on students wearing niqab was overturned some years ago) #Egypt

Sept. 30 4 terrorists killed in Alexandria – same incident as below but this report notes they were in attacks in Beheira.

Sept. 29 4 #MuslimBrotherhood killed in exchange of gunfire in #Agamy #Alexandria #Egypt Wed.

Sept. 27 Egyptian army foiled attempt by 7 militants from Gaza crossing via sea into Egypt’s Rafah city.

Sept. 27 Schools in #Rafah and #ShaykhZuwayd#Sinai postponed to 10th of October #Egypt

Sept. 27 Five #Copts injured in attacks in #Samalout and #Minya  over church construction

Sept. 26 Attack on Saturday, in Arish killed 2 of #Egypt‘s soldiers and injured 16 – roadside bomb #Sinai

Sept. 25 Nine militants killed in Zaidiya in exchange of fire with security.

They were thought to be Muslim Brotherhood members The NYT article sayd killed for connection to the attack on the Italian consulate & seems to imply they weren’t.

Sept. 23 Sinai’s Bedouin Jerken Band plays jerry cans left in the desert

Sept. 23 #Egypt‘s army seized weapons & explosives in #Giza & #Arish #counterterrorism

Sept. 23 Clashes between Egypt’s security forces and Islamist supporters in Alexandria following Eid prayers

Sept. 23 Prosecutors investigated those who were plotting to smuggle Pres. Morsi from Bourj al-Arab prison.

Sept. 23 Al Jazeera journalists were among 100 other prisoners released or released and pardoned for the Eid al-Adha

Sept. 22 Five tons of marijuana seized at Hurghada


Sept. 22 Egypt detains Khaled al-Beltagy, age 16, son of imprisoned leader Muhammad al-Beltagy

Sept. 22 Egypt has demolished 3,255 homes in the Sinai for the buffer zone according to Human Rights Watch and not given notice or reparations.

Sept 21 46 alleged Muslim Brotherhood members arrested in Egypt

Sept. 21 Egypt’s Cabinet of Ministers issued a comprehensive statement on the plan to battle terrorism in the Sinai:

Sept. 20 A bomb explodes outside the Foreign Ministry Office in Mohandesin.

Sept. 20 Pro-Muslim Brotherood figure Sharaby, (hosted by State Dept. in January and who spoke at UC Berkeley) calls on NY followers to “siege” Sisi’s hotel during UNGA visit

Sept. 20 Bio of Egypt’s new prosecutor-general Nabil Sadek

Sept. 19 #Egypt Brigadier General killed overnight in North #Sinai city of al-Arish; two others killed in IED explosion via @AssetSource

Sept. 19 IS in Sinai released a statement urging tribes to fight the army. Via Ashw_s6 – account suspended.  The statement “To the Defiant Tribes of the Sinai” is available here:

Sept. 18 A number of top al-Qaeda figures were released as part of a prisoner exchange with Iran. An Iranian kidnapped in Yemen was released for these figures which include Egyptians, Seif al-Adel, Abu Kair al-Masri and Abdullah Ahmad Abdullah and several Jordanians.

Sept. 18 #IS#Sinai published wrap of attacks in #Egypt during previoua Islamic month. Still no mention of Sep 3 IED incidents with #MFO.

Source @ZLGold.

Sept. 18 Mexico demands compensation for the Mexican tourists killed in an Egyptian military strike in the desert.

Sept. 16 145 prison inmates to be released in #Egypt for the #EidAlAdha

Sept. 16 55 militants and 2 soliders killed in ongoing Operation Martyrs’ Right in #Sinai accrdg to authorities #Egypt

Sept. 11 – unverified claims by ISIS that it targeted vehicle using advanced missiles (but others say car bomb/IED)

Sept. 11 – Militants in northern Sinai attacked civilians killing a woman & child   however same incident is reported as shelling of house kills a woman and “probably by Army” via @BigPharoah

Sept. 10 Local leader of Brotherhood’s FJP Youth Wing for Beni Suef shot dead by Egyptian police during arrest raid. Via @AssetSourceApp

Sept 10 Anti-tank & helicopter weapons acquired by #WilayatSinai – photos #Egypt #Sinai

Sept. 10 US to send an additional 75 troops to increase protection of MFO in #Sinai

Sept. 9 30 ABM militants killed, 41 captured, 3 Explosives warehouses destroyed in #Egypt army’s “Martyr Right” mil. Op in Shk Zwayed, Arish&Rafah source Hassan Sari

Sept. 9 #ISIS Terror Group Release Photos Claims Anti-Tank & Anti-Aircraft Training Courses In #Sinai (see TL)

Sept 9 More photos from Wilayat Sinai posted as Daily Life of the Mujahid

Sept 8 Egypt’s spokesman told Reuters that Egyptian troops would arrive in Yemen today.

Sept. 8 The Egyptian army announced that it had begun a major anti-militant operation “Martyrs’  “ in the north Sinai on Monday and killed 29 militants. 2 soldiers were killed.

Sept. 7 57 additional NGOs have been closed for ties with the Muslim Brotherhood

Sept. 6 The 3rd field Army Commander meets with elders of the tribes in South #Sinai.

Sept 5 Egyptian military said it had prevented the illegal immigration of 228 people – refugees

Sept. 4 On the 6 peacekeepers injured –

Sept. 4 Egypt gas pipeline bombed again last night in the northern Sinai.

Sept. 3 Six peacekeepers injured in 2 IED explosions #Sinai – 4 are Americans.  #Egypt

Sept 3 #3 terrorists killed in Sheikh Zwayed: Spokesman

Sept. 3 Article claims terrorism is spreading across Egypt https//

Sept. 2   Two IEDs exploded inside a shop reportedly belonging to a Coptic Christian in Qena, southern #Egypt

Sept. 1 Suicide bombing in al-Arish city was thwarted and the militant was killed.

Sept. 1 Video released from Wilayat Sinai (in my twitter feed)

Aug 31 #Breaking Egypt foils car bomb attack likely targeting police station in al-Arish, Sinai (via @AssetSourceApp

Aug 31 An Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis member, Ahmad Abdul Hakim of Zawya al-Hamra was killed in Cairo

Aug 31 Egypt begins building fish farms on the Gaza border – further discouraging the building of smuggling tunnels

Aug 29 How Wilayat Sinai operates via other groups within mainland Egypt

Aug. 28 Two killed in clashes with security forces in Fayoum

Aug. 28 A policeman returning from work shot and killed in Sohag

Aug 28   12 defendents given preliminary death sentences for crimes (also recruitment) for Wilayat Sinai by an Egyptian court. Six are being tried in abstentia.

Aug 27 Those involved in attack on tourist bus near #Karnak #Luxor site referred to military court #Egypt

Aug 26 Another prisoner dies in #Fayoum police station – 2nd in 3 days.  #Egypt

Aug 26 Twoolicemen who were guarding a post office in al-Arish were killed by unknown gunmen

Also see

Aug 25 Police intercept network that makes bombs and rockets

Aug 24 The number of casualties in the bombing of a police bus rose to 3 (and 27 wounded) on the Rashid-Damanour road in Behaira rose to 3

Aug 23 Abu Al-Qasim, alleged military head of Wilayat #Sinai, killed in airstrike–per anon sources in sympathetic media (?) via Zack Gold

Aug 23 A lawsuit demanding that Human Rights Watch leave Egypt was filed and accepted. Filed by a rights organization and it claims that HRW has held meetings with the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar and in the “US Congress”

Aug 23 Egyptian security forces use teargas on striking lower-ranking police in Sharqiyya

Aug 23 Ministry of Endowments #Egypt bans any promotion of political candidates in the mosques

Aug 22 Life terms for Egypt‘s Badie and 18 Brotherhood members

Aug 22 Three Facebook users were arrested in Sohag for their support of Wilayat Sinai

Aug 22 5 terrorist killed, 18 others injured in Rafah

Aug 21 10 terrorists killed and 11 captured by Egyptian army forces in North Sinai

New round of intense Egyptian airstrikes just now, south of Rafa

Aug 21 Egypt’s Army Chief of Staff met the UK national security advisor

Aug 20 Daesh-affiliate ABM claims responsibility over Cairo blast: “in retaliation to “martyred brothers” of Arab Sharkas”

Aug 20 Wilayat Sinai claimed the bombing at the courthouse

Aug 19 4 #Palestinians kidnapped by gunmen after leaving #Rafah #Sinai #Egypt

Aug 19 Loud explosion in #Cairo was a car bomb in front of a security building and near a courthouse in Shubra al-Kheima The explosion caused 20 cars to smash and wounded 29 (most not seriously) #Egypt

Aug 19 Pres. Sisi calls for preemptive measures to discourage terrorism as 50 clerics met in a conference to discuss extremist fatwas

Aug 18 #ISIS-affiliated Wilayat Sinai claimed responsibility for an IED attack against a troop carrier that injured two near Sheikh Zuweid #Egypt

Aug 18 Egypt’s forces on high alert at Libyan border after Libyan border guards disappear

Egypt: Security, Terrorism, Sinai Update for Aug. 1 – 17, 2015

17 Aug

Aug. 17 Wilayet Sinai, claim to have targeted an army APC near a ‘gas station’ south of Sheikh Zuweid (Joe Gulhane, no source given to me – if provided will list)

Aug 17 Police officer dies from injuries in last Monday’s bombing #Egypt and #AjnadMisr
claims responsibility

Aug 17 New anti-terrorism laws in #Egypt:

Aug 17 Omar Ashour criticizes the Egyptian governments campaign in the Sinai and repression.

Aug 16 A draft law to end penalties on journalists has been revealed. How this elides with the new penalties on contradicting government sources in the antiterrorism laws is unclear.
Aug. 16 #Egypt’s Min. of Interior says it has broken up 3 #MuslimBrotherhood cells.

Aug. 16 The Egyptian military is continuing its operations near the Libyan border.

Aug 16 Online statement attributed to a group calling itself Tahrir Brigades, claims to be defected officers, claimed Barakat assassination

Aug. 16 North #Sinai court returns to #Sinai fllwing 3 mo. relocation due to terrorist
attacks. #Egypt

Aug 16 Body of Palestinian man from Rafah found near the border this morning.

Aug 15 #Rabaa protests had low turnout – some arrests; in contrast to online activism #Egypt

Aug. 15 #Russia gives #Egypt a Molniya missile corvette

Aug. 13 Egypt confiscates assets of the chairman of Juhayna for ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Aug. 13/Aug 12 ISIS in Egypt (Wilayat Sinai) beheaded a Croatian captive , Tomislav Salopek

Aug 12 A policeman was killed today in #Fayoum, south of Cairo, in #Egypt

Aug 11 253 sentenced in abstentia to life in prison for committing violence in Beheira

Aug 11 Badie referred to court in a new trial

Aug. 12 #Egypt Apache war helicopter strikes vehicle in Al-Kharroubah village, S. Sheikh Zwayyed, N.Sinai killing 3 Daesh-affiliate members aboard

Aug 12 Curfew hours reduced in al-#Arish #Sinai #Egypt

Aug 12 Alaa Selim (photojournalist) found dead in Abu Taweela village near Shaykh Zuwayd, circumstances unclear

Aug 11 New York Times Editorial (which has published numerous scathing critiques of Egypt’s government) wants the #MFO out of the #Sinai.

Aug 10 Ten persons were recommended to receive death sentences, so their cases go to the Grand Mufti for his opinion

Aug 10 IED blast injures 3 persons outside a court in Heliopolis

Aug 9 2 killed in clashes between security forces and group of armed men in #Suez #Egypt

Aug 9 Revolutionary Punishment group claims attack in El-Sinnuris near ‪#Fayoum‬‬ earlier today. ‪#‎Egypt‬‬

Aug 9 World’s largest container ship, the Marstel Maersk crosses the new Suez Canal

Aug 9 Policeman killed in al-Arish after a different officer in the same position was killed.

Aug 9 A bomb targeted an armored vehicle in northern Sinai killing 2 security personnel, injuring 3

Aug 8 18 militants were killed over the last 2 days’ shelling of Shaykh Zuweid and Rafah – reportedly by Apaches

Aug 7 Fears mount for the fate of the Croation hostage seized in 22 of July – interesting detail, his driver was released.

Aug 6 Raid on a farm in Sanoris in Fayoum – five are killed. A report from Aug 9 including some controversial details

Aug 6
#Egypt N.#Sinai / Army Helicopter targets 35 #Hamas terrorists in a smuggling tunnel with #Gaza

Aug 6 The new Suez Canal (which took only one year instead of five to complete) was celebrated with an inaugural ceremony.

Aug 5 ISIS affiliate (Wilayat Sinai) has threatened to kill a Croatian hostage in 48 hours.

Aug 4 Five civilians killed when their house was shelled during clashes in northern Sinai

Aug 4 Unidentified gunmen killed a policeman standing guard outside a police station in Sharqiyya

Aug. 2 Army says it has killed 88 suspected militants in the Sinai between July 20 and July 31

Aug 2 Car owned by Judge Moh. Abdullah Abbas (al-Khanka court) explodes from bomb. No injuries #Egypt

Aug 1. Egypt’s army says it has killed a leading figure in Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis